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CONFLATING POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT?

EXAMINING INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION OUTCOMES
SUSAN D. FRANCK*
Internationaldispute settlement is an area of ongoing evaluation and tension
within the internationalpoliticaleconomy. As states continue their negotiations
for the Trans-Pacfic Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the efficacy of internationalarbitrationas a
method of dispute settlement remains controversial. Whereas some sing its
praises as a method of protectingprivate properly interests against improper
government interference, others decr investment treao arbitration (ITA) as
biased against states. The literature has thus far not disentangled how politics
and development contribute to investment dispute outcomes. In an effort to
controlforthe effect of internalstatepolitics, this Article offers the first analysis
of ITA outcomes, focusing on respondent states' development status while
simultaneously controllingfor states' democracy levels. Using a dataset of 159
final ITA awards from prior to Januar 2012, the Article conducts
quantitative analyses of outcomes as a function of raw wins and losses,
amounts awarded, and relative investor success. Initialy, when evaluating
outcomes based on a respondent state ' membership in the Organisationfor
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or a state's score on the
UN Development Programme (UNDP)Human Development Index, it was
notpossible to identii a reliable link to outcomes. Only defining a respondents
development status using a World Bank classification generated reliable
differences for Upper-Middle income states, and only for two measures of
outcome - namely raw wins and amounts awarded. Using the World Bank
measure, there was no statistically significant relationship with relative investor
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success. None of these anayses, however, controlledfor the level of internal
state democracy to identibf how democracy levels, which can reflect good
governance infrastructure,might contribute to outcomes. After controllingfor the
effect of a state's internal democracy levels, twelve analyses were unable to
identify a reliable link with ITA outcomes and development status irrespective
of how development status was defined. While the Article cannot conclusively
exclude the possibility of systemic bias in ITA against the developing world, it
provides additionalevidence suggesting the potentialabsence of such bias or the
importance of alternative explanatory variables. The results also suggest that
focusing on development status alone may be unwarranted,andfuture research
should explore internal levels of democray or other indicators of good
governance, which could be associated with the decreased risk of a state loss.
The Article concludes that normative choicesfocused solely on respondent state
development status miss an opportunity to craft normative solutions tailoredto
redress tangibleproblems. By focusing on variables that demonstrably contribute
to variance in ITA outcomes, stakeholders could construct more appropriate
international dispute settlement processes in a time of international
economic transition.
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INTRODUCTION

As global economic activity continues to expand during a time of
worldwide economic shifts, international investment law has emerged as an
area of mounting interest. In 2012, the global total of foreign-directinvestment stock was approximately US$23 trillion.' Meanwhile, the
number of international investment treaties, which offer substantive
investment rights and contain ex ante agreements permitting investors to
require states to arbitrate substantive violations, continues to increase.
With trillions of dollars protected by at least one international investment
2
agreement (IIA) and theoretically subject to treaty-based arbitration,
changes in political and economic circumstances generate conflict, and
investors have exercised their new treaty rights. Since the first award was
rendered in 1990, 3 the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) estimates there have been more than 500
4
known disputes.
With increased political, economic, and legal scrutiny on international
investment and dispute resolution, investor-state dispute settlement has
become a global hot button issue, as demonstrated by policy debates and
negotiations surrounding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and
1. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013:
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at xv, 217 Annex tbl. 2,

U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2013].
2. See id. at 217 Annex tbl. 2; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011: NON-EQuITY
MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, at 102-03, 191, U.N. Sales No.
E.11.II.D.2 (2012).
3. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case1990),
(June
27,
Award
documents/ital034.pdf.
4. UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note 1, at 110-11 (through the end of 2012); UNCTAD, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES, at 86,

U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2012]; see also UNCTAD, IIA Issues
Note No. 1: Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), at 9-10, UNCTAD Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2014/3 (2014) [hereinafter UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note 2014], available
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3-en.pdf (suggesting the number of

concluded cases is more than 270, but failing to explain the definition for "concluded" cases to
permit comparison to existing datasets).

16

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 55:1

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership C-TIP). Part of these
concerns derive from claims that investment treaty arbitration (ITA) is
illegitimate 5 and that ITA detrimentally impacts the developing world to
the benefit of only developed states. 6 As a result, there has been a deep reexamination of how investment treaty conflict should be resolved. 7 Some
have proposed alternative or supplementary methods of managing
investment treaty conflict, including mediation.8 Others recommend
exiting the system entirely.9 In response, some states have voted with their
feet to exit the international investment law regime, yet other states exhibit
a preference to stay the course and rely on preexisting paradigms for
dispute settlement.
While politics and legal disputes may be inextricably intertwined, the
debate thus far has not disentangled internal state politics from the
5. See, e.g.,Susan D. Franck, The Legimagy Crisis in Investment Treay Arbitration PivatZing Public
InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2004) [hereinafter Franck,
Legitimacy Crisis]. Compare PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, CORPORATE EUR. OBSERVATORY &
TRANSNATIONAL INST., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: How LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND
FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), available at

http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/ffles/pubications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf
(articulating concerns with ITA), with Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From 'Dealing in Virtue"
to 'Profitingfrom Injustice": The Case Against 'Re-Statflcation" of Investment Dispute Settlement, 55 HARV.
INT'L
L.J.
ONLINE
45
gan.
2014),
http://www.harvardilj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/BrowerBlanchardto.Publish.pdf (refuting claims about the concerns
with ITA).

6. See, e.g., ICSID-InternationalCentre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, BRETTON WOODS
PROJECT (last modified Aug. 19, 2009), http://old.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=537853
("Reasons for the vocal and mounting critiques against ICSID peg around its governance [and] its
biasness [sic] in favour of rich countries... ."); Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 437, 445-48 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and
Outcomes] (gathering sources identifying claims explaining that developing countries are more
disadvantaged by ITA); Kevin Gallagher & Elen Shrestha, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing
Countries:A Re-Appraisal, 12 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 919 (2011) (arguing that developing
countries experience larger risks than developed countries); Douglas Thompson, Kahale Calls for
Overhaul
of
BIT
System,
GLOBAL
ARB.
REV.,
Apr.
11,
2014,
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/artidcle/32567/kahale-cas-overhaul-bit-system/
(referring
to George Kahale's calling investment treaties "weapons of legal destruction" and stating there is "a
systemic bias against states" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. See generaly THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:

PERCEPTIONS AND

REAIATY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter THE BACKLASH] (discussing various concerns
about ITA).
8. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Trea~y Conflct and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 161 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Dispute Systems Design] (discussing the application of dispute
systems design principles to managing investment treaty conflict); Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State
Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Management: An Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID REV. 66, 66-68, 88
(2014) [hereinafter Franck, Conflict Managemen4 (describing the potential application of mediation to
investment treaty conflicts); Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Though ulIntegration of
Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 passim (2013)
(discussing how to integrate mediation into investment treaty dispute settlement).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text (discussing calls for reform related to
eliminating ITA or placing disputes into the hands of national court judges).

2014]

CONFLATING POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT?

resolution of investment treaty dispute settlement. Yet, attributing
accountability of outcomes to development-related factors is unwarranted
where unsupported by data or where other factors are more directly linked
to outcome. Domestic politics - particularly where a state's political acts
form the basis of the underlying dispute - potentially contribute to
outcomes, and this may be similar to, or different from, developmentrelated variables. It is therefore proper to examine the role of politics,
particularly democracy levels within host states, and identify how
democracy might - or might not - impact outcomes of investment
treaty disputes. Disentangling the variance attributable to development and
politics has the potential to generate a better understanding of variables
contributing to outcomes. By isolating variables reliably linked to ITA
outcomes, it becomes possible to differentiate between illegitimate bases
for differential outcomes (e.g., development backgrounds that should be
independent of a case's merits) and those potentially legitimate variables
(e.g., a state's political environment that may be linked to the government
activity that forms the basis of the cause of action).
This Article, therefore, will explore links among ITA outcomes,
respondent state democracy levels, and state development indicators. It will
use quantitative models to explore ITA outcomes and will re-examine
outcomes as a function of the respondent state's level of democracy.
While governmental structures and political activity may contribute to
generating ITA conflict, the data used in this study were unable to provide
evidence that a state's development background reliably affected ITA
outcomes when controlling for a host state's democracy levels. While there
is inevitably a risk of error, and recognizing that viewing limited
development variables in isolation might create an impression of systemic
bias, this Article will argue that ITA outcomes are a complicated
phenomenon that is not attributable to a simple explanatory variable.
While focusing on an isolated variable like development may be intuitively
appealing, it nevertheless generates a risk of misperception.
In an effort to test intuition against data and address the gap within the
literature, the Article will seek to offer information that stakeholders might
use to craft normative reforms. It will do so by first exploring the history
of investment dispute resolution and its doctrinal foundation. Next, the
Article will highlight current aspects of the debate over ITA. Third, it will
identify the research methodologies and hypotheses related to
development, democracy, and outcomes of investment disputes. Fourth,
the Article will demonstrate that although there was a reliable link between
development and outcomes only when development was defined using a
World Bank index, rather than two alternative measures of development,
but after controlling for democracy levels, none of the models explored
could identify a reliable link between outcome and a respondent's
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development status. Fifth, the Article will interpret the results, explore the
limitations, and recognize that the results require replication before
definitively concluding there is no link between the respondents'
development levels and ITA outcomes. In the interim, this Article will
posit that a respondent's development status may be a facially enticing, but
perhaps misleading, focal point. The Article will argue that ITA outcomes
require a complicated, multivariate explanation, and focusing on alternative
explanatory variables may ultimately prove more productive.
This Article will conclude by arguing that normative choices focused
solely on a respondent state's development status miss the opportunity to
generate normative solutions tailored to address real problems.
International investment law should focus instead on designing dispute
resolution systems tailored to generate meaningful solutions to
demonstrable problems. Stakeholders should focus on other areas, such as
promoting and implementing good governance practices and preventing
investment conflict from erupting in the first instance. The objective
should be to provide states with incentives to comply with domestic and
international law, to promote a favorable investment climate, and to limit
exposure to unnecessary or unmeritorious claims. Similarly, although it
must be done with caution, states may also wish to focus on improving the
quality of their domestic regulatory activities, promoting good governance
practices, and exploring how best to promote democratic institutions
within the state.10 By focusing on variables that demonstrably contribute to
the variance of ITA outcomes, ITA will generate a more legitimate and
appropriate dispute resolution process during a period of international
economic transition.
I. THE HISTORY AND DOCTRINE OF INVESTMENT
TREATY DISPUTE RESOLUTION

ITA is a hybrid suigeneris creature that owes its doctrinal and policy basis
to both public and private international law. ITA involves the rights of
private individuals, their commercial activities, the vindication of rights
through an adjudicative forum, and remedies involving damage awards.
ITA's public international law elements involve the law of state
responsibility, the regulatory activity of state actors, and states' capacity to
craft international law instruments that voluntarily curtail their regulatory
authority to incentivize private commercial activity.11
10. See infra notes 151-54 (indicating that, although two analyses were on the cusp of significance
for the group of all awards and not significant for the subset of cases where states won, there was
some facial evidence that lower levels of democracy were associated with adverse awards in the form
of higher amounts awarded or a greater degree of an investor's relative success).
11. See general# Jost E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING
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Historically, investors' options for addressing disputes arising from
government activity included simply ignoring investment conflict and
accepting it as a cost of doing business (and pricing commercial risk
accordingly), obtaining political risk insurance coverage and passing the
cost of conflict on to a secondary market, or asking the investor's home
state to invoke its diplomatic rights on behalf of the investor. 12 Other
solutions required a political assessment, including declarations of war,
exercises of "gunboat diplomacy," lobbying the investor's home state to
invoke formal diplomatic relief, or soliciting an investor's home state to
espouse its claim at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 13 Yet indirect
dispute resolution under international law was largely unsatisfactory, as it
prohibited direct and immediate access to neutral dispute resolution,
politicized dispute resolution by placing it within the sphere of
international relations, and generated a remedy for the state but not for the
14
damaged investor.
Against this backdrop, states and investors began using HAs to permit
international arbitration of international investment law obligations. ITA
was an evolutionary step intended to provide investors with direct rights
and a real forum for non-politicized rule of law adjudication. The
objective was to permit states to avoid making the difficult - and
ironically often political - decision of whether to espouse an investor's
claim. 15 ITA granted investors the direct choice to decide whether, in light
of the net costs and benefits, pursuing a claim was appropriate. ITA also
offered a tried and tested process - namely international arbitration INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (2011) (discussing investment treaty dispute settlement); KRISTA
NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS

(2013) (same); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms:Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treay
System, 107 AM.J. INT'L L. 45 (2013) (discussing private and public law aspects of state liability under
international investment law).
12. C.f. STEPHAN W SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 1-22 (2009) (tracing the evolution of international investment law); NATHAN M. JENSEN ET
AL., POLITICS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 115-45 (2012) (discussing how firms can lobby
related to foreign investment disputes); Franck, Legitimay Crisis, supra note 5, at 1521-35.
13. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (2012) (describing the history of international investment law); see also Anthea

Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theoty of Interdependent Rights and Shared
InterpretiveAuthority, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-17 (2014) (discussing gunboat diplomacy and the

history of ITA); Jason Webb Yackee, Controllingthe InternationalInvestment Law Ageny, 53 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 391 (2012).
14. SUSAN D. FRANCK, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: MYTHS, REALITIES AND COSTS
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter FRANCK, MYTHS & REALITIES]; see also Susan D. Franck, The ICSID

Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 825, 833-34 (2011)
[hereinafter Franck, ICSID Effect; Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID's Legitimay Debate: Towards a Goal-Based
EmpiricalAgenda,36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 465, 471-75 (2013) (discussing the history of investor-state
dispute settlement).
15. See Andreas F Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Tranoformation, 38 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 47, 51-52 (2009).

20

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 55:1

whose historical pedigree offered an opportunity for adjudicative
neutrality. Moreover, the existence of two preexisting treaties, namely the
New York Convention 16 and the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, i7 offered a reliable, established,
and streamlined enforcement regime. In theory, ITA generated a more
balanced playing field and fostered adjudication of investment disputes in
a manner designed to minimize commercial risk, decrease political risk,
8
and maximize rule of law'
The theoretical framework, however, must be placed within a doctrinal
context to understand the basis of the arbitration agreement and
applicable law. 9 First, it is critical to observe that ITA derives from HAs.
The net objective of an 11A is to entice inbound foreign investment and to
protect a state's own investors abroad while minimizing the risk of state
liability. IIAs typically involve a pair or group of countries signing a treaty,
such as the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR),20 that promises to protect international investment within
the territory of the host state. HAs grant reciprocal investment rights of both a procedural and substantive nature - to the foreign investors of
the signatory countries. In some, but not all, instances, IAs secure the
21
intended benefit of foreign investment.
Procedurally, HAs offer clear dispute resolution rights, including the
right to arbitrate treaty disputes. After complying with certain
prerequisites, such as notification of disputes and attempting amicable
settlement, HAs permit investors to directly bring a claim against a state to
a tribunal in which both parties appoint adjudicators. ITA also has the
virtue of preventing blanket claims of immunity from suit - whether by
virtue of sovereign immunity or political question doctrines - that might
16. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
17. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, openedfor signature Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
18. FRANCK, MYTHS & REALITIES, supranote 14.

19. Much of the overview of ITA doctrinal context and arbitration mechanics in this Part derives
from the author's earlier summaries. See, e.g., Franck, ICSID Effect, supra note 14, at 835-37.
20. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El
Sa.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004).
21. See Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic
Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT'L ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2011) (reviewing
conditions where IIAs are linked with increased investment); Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent
Credib;ev: The Impact of Investment Treay Violations on ForeignDirect Investment, 65 INT'L ORG. 401 (2011)
(discussing the utility of IIAs and the capacity to secure investment flows, particularly in light of
threatened or successful ITA disputes). Compare Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences:
BilateralInvestment Treaties and Bargaining Power over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 1
(2010), with Jason Webb Yackee, Do BilateralInvestment Treaties Promote Foreign Investment? Some Hints
from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397 (2010).
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otherwise prevent investors from bringing their claims in national courts.22

Despite intending to provide a neutral, legitimate forum for states to
resolve disputes without allegations of bias, ITA has fallen prey to claims
23
that it is politicized and biased - particularly against developing states.
Substantively, IIAs involve state promises that foreign investors will
receive certain minimal treatment, including the right to freedom from
unlawful expropriation without proper compensation, the right to freedom

from discrimination, and guarantees of fair and equitable treatment. These
rights are analogous to using international law to provide an economic bill
of rights for foreign investors. 24 Some legal disputes arising under IAs
involve public law elements, such as Zimbabwe's expropriation of land

belonging to certain white farmers or the imposition of an environmental
25
regulation that has a de facto disparate impact on foreign companies.
Other disputes have a more commercial flavor, such as the revocation of a
banking license or breach of contract. 26 Certain disputes, although not

necessarily representative of the larger whole, have become iconic symbols
in ITA. For example, groups of investors have sued Argentina for its 2001
currency crisis that led to the devaluation of the Argentine peso and

decreased the value of investments, particularly those denominated in U.S.
Dollars. 27 Similarly, Phillip Morris sued Australia and Uruguay for their

plain-packaging cigarette regulations as an unlawful expropriation of its
28
intellectual property rights.

22. See, e.g., Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution
Mechanism in BilateralInvestment Treaties, 47 INT'L LAW. 273, 274-79 (2013).
23. See Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID UnderSiege, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603 (2012).
24. See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 48 (2005); David
Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionahsm,25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767 (2000).
25. See Funnekotter v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award (Apr. 22, 2009),
available at http://italaw.com/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf (deciding claim against Zimbabwe
for repossession of land from white farmers); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaU747.pdf
(adjudicating
dispute
involving claim that foreigner was disparately impacted by domestic environmental regulation of
PCBs); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reay, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1550, 1555-57 (2009) (describing
the South Africa and Argentina cases); Julie A. Maupin, DifferentiatingAmong InternationalInvestment
Disputes, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO

PRACTICE 467 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014) (discussing multiple cases using socio-legal,
territorial, and political dimensions).
26. See, e.g., Ross P Buckley & Paul Blyschak, Guar&ng the Open Door:Non-Party PartidpalionBefore
the InternationalCentrefor Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 BANK. & FIN. L. REV. 353, 366 (2007); see
also Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora'sBox: Sovereign Bonds in InternationalArbitration,101 AM. J. INT'L L.
711,712-13 (2007).
27. See generallyALVAREZ, supra note 11 (compiling cases).
28. Philip Morris Brands Sbrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/fles/casedocuments/italawl53l.pdf; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration

22

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 55:1

As a matter of arbitration mechanics, if a foreign investor believes a
host state has violated its substantive treaty rights, IlAs permit direct
redress against the host state through the treaty's dispute resolution
mechanism. This is the genesis of ITA, as IIAs permit investors to resolve
their disputes directly and finally through arbitration. A cause of action
under an IIA generally involves a foreign investor asserting that the host
state's conduct violated the treaty and damaged the investment. If the
dispute is not otherwise resolved through negotiation or mediation, the
investor requires the state to arbitrate. While IIAs vary, investors can
generally elect to arbitrate before: (1) an ad hoc tribunal organized under the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules; (2) the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC); or (3)
a tribunal organized through the World Bank's ICSID.29 Despite some
variations, these rules offer the procedural backbone for arbitration that
operates as an individualized code of civil procedure subject to
modifications by mutual agreement; they particularize baselines for the
filing of pleadings, the selection and challenge of arbitrators, challenges to
jurisdiction, the gathering and assessment of evidence, and the writing
30
of awards.
Arbitration mechanics are relatively straightforward. After complying
with the necessary jurisdictional prerequisites, investors initiate arbitration
by submitting a request for arbitration to one of the forums permitted by
the treaty. Thereafter, the process of selecting a tribunal begins. Each party
can generally select one arbitrator, and then either an arbitral institution or
31
the two co-arbitrators typically appoint a presiding arbitrator or chair.
After signing statements of independence and impartiality, panels of three
arbitrators resolve investment disputes 32 in accordance with the applicable
law,33 which generally includes the procedural rules, the applicable
(Nov. 21, 2011), availableat http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita665.pdf.
29. There is some evidence that IIAs permit investors to arbitrate at the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC). See Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Creible Commitment, and the
Rule of (International)Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 808,
812 (2008); UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 1: Latest Developments in Investor-State Dipute Settlement, at 2,

UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/10 (2012) [hereinafterUNCTAD, IIA Issues Note
2012], available at http://unctad.org/en/PubficationsUbrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf (indicating
only seven known ICC cases).
30. Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Derides in InternationalInvestment Arbitration?, 35 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 431, 438-54 (2013).
31. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1696 (2d ed. 2014); Franck,
Lgitimacy Crisis,supra note 5, at 1543-44.
32. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 124

(1995); Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Clims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 77 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Empiricaly Evaluating] (stating that "out of 102 awards, 100
awards had three-member tribunals, and sole arbitrators rendered two awards").
33. Toby Landau, Report, Composition and Estabishment of the Tibunak Articles 14 to 36, 9 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 45, 52-53 (1998); Andreas F Lowenfeld, The Party-AppointedArbitrator in International
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substantive provisions of the IIA, and other relevant principles of
34
international law.
Parties then marshal their facts and legal arguments to address different
phases of the dispute, namely, jurisdiction, merits, quantum, and costs.
The investor must first establish that it meets the three primary
jurisdictional thresholds: (1) a qualifying investor, and (2) a qualifying
investment that is (3) brought under an enforceable treaty within a proper
time frame. If those prerequisites are not established, the case terminates
and the state is not subject to liability under the IIA. Otherwise, the
dispute continues. The merits phase involves a tribunal's determination of
whether the respondent breached the treaty's substantive obligations and
the specific protections the host state promised to foreign investors. If
there is no substantive breach, the case terminates; otherwise, the dispute
continues. At the quantum phase, the parties establish the value of the
substantive treaty breach. Cost awards and assessments can be made at any
point in the course of the lifetime of the dispute; and ultimately, although
several awards or interim decisions on these core areas can occur, the
35
tribunal renders a final award.
The final doctrinal foundation relates to the international treaty that
provides for recognition and enforcement of underlying awards. The two
primary treaties permitting enforcement of arbitral awards are the ICSID
Convention and the New York Convention. Although there are slight
differences in the methodology, both treaties generally provide narrow
bases for challenges to the awards and permit final awards to be
enforceable worldwide. 36
II. THE DEBATE ABOUT ITA
Debates related to the utility of ITA suggest that, thus far, its perceived
success has exhibited variation akin to swings of a pendulum. 37 During its
early phase, many commentators gave ITA "overwhelming praise" for its

Controversies: Some RKlecfions, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 65-66 (1995); Claudia T. Salomon, Commentary,
Selecting an InternationalArbitrator:Five Factors to Consider, 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, 2-3 (2002).
34. Yas Banifatemi, Mapping the Future of Investment Treaty Arbitration as a System of Law, 103 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 323, 323-24 (2009) (summary of panel remarks); Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Mandatoy Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration,18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 175 (2007).
35. See, e.g., LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2010); ANDREW
NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF

TREATMENT (2009); see also Susan D. Franck, Rationali#ng Costs in Investment Treay Arbitration, 88
WASH U. L. REV. 769 (2011) (discussing costs awards).
36. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 5, at 1539-55.

37. See generally Sergio Puig, Emergence & Dynamism in InternationalOrganitations.:ICSID, Investor-State
Arbitration & InternationalInvestment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 531 (2012) (discussing historical shifts in

ITA).
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"unmitigated" success. 38 Supportive commentary came from international
law luminaries such as Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, who has identified the
benefits of ITA for both capital-importing and exporting states. 39 This
optimism may have been a byproduct of an increase in the foreign
investment flows and in the number of treaties with a small number of
disputes. In this period, the benefits seemed tangible and the risks
appeared minimal. Yet cognitive illusions may have contributed to this
perception. For example, the primacy effect may mean that the initial cases
left a lasting impression that formed the basis for conscious or
subconscious comparisons; 40 heuristics may facilitate initial cases being
easier to recollect, in turn more readily discussed, more widely available,
and ultimately perceived as representative of the larger population. 41 Early
adjudication under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
may have been viewed as favorable when contrasted with somewhat
contemporaneous or prominent ICJ litigation. A few years before
NAFTA, for instance, the United States was unable to establish an
expropriation claim on behalf of investors in

ELSI.42

Unlike the nearly six

decades required to secure full compliance with the ICJ damage award in
Corfu Chann, 43 ITA cases - like Metaclad,44 where U.S. investors received
a prompt payment from Mexico after Mexico unsuccessfully challenged

38. David P Riesenberg, Note, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Poliy Justiing
Application of the Enghsh Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 985 (2010) (discussing the satisfaction and praise for
the existing ITA system and citing Jeswald Salacuse, Stephen Schwebel, Thomas Waelde, Ian Laird,
and Joel Beauvais, who have extolled the virtues of ITA).
39. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Ovenvhelming Meits of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 263 (2008).

40. For example, flashbulb memories highlight detailed and emotionally vivid memories that
seem fresh, precise, and easy to recollect. They can, however, be inaccurate. Should experience with
ITA generate a flashbulb memory, this could theoretically facilitate inaccurate impressions and
perceptions. CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: AND OTHER
WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE Us 68-78 (2010).

41. See FRANCK, MYTHS & REALITIES, supra note 14 (discussing heuristics including primacy,
availability, and representativeness); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)
(discussing similar heuristics); see also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availabik y Cascadesand Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999) (identifying how the availability heuristic can "trigger[ ] a
chain reaction that gives [a] perception [of] increasing plausibility through its rising availability in
public discourse").
42. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v.It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
43. Compare Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (awarding the United
Kingdom for damages to two ships in 1946), uitb David J. Bederman, Juriprudenceof the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission Albania Claims, 106 AM.J. hNT'L L. 271, 272 n.11 (2012) (noting Albania paid the
ICJ judgment in October 1996); see also Barry E. Carter et ai., Comparative Analysis of International
Dispute Resolution Institutions, 85 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC. 64, 64 (1991) (describing how prior to
payment "over forty years after the decision in the Cofu Channel case, Albania has yet to pay Great
Britain').
44. Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of the Tribunal
(Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002).
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the award in a Canadian court 45 - were comparatively attractive. Some
commentators continue to praise ITA and suggest that "[s]tates and
46
investors both stand to benefit from international arbitration."
Despite the initial wave of satisfaction, perception has shifted: Some
commentary expresses discontent with ITA. Concerns come from various
quarters, including international organizations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), academics, and states. UNCTAD's World
Investment Report 2012, for example, discussed "perceived shortcomings"
of the system, emphasizing opportunities for
reigning in the growing number of [ITA] cases, fostering the
legitimacy and increasing the transparency of [ITA] proceedings,
dealing with inconsistent readings of key provisions in HAs and
poor treaty interpretation, improving the impartiality and quality of
arbitrators, reducing the length and costs of proceedings, assisting
developing countries in handling [ITA] cases, and addressing
47
overall concerns about the functioning of the system.
Others suggest ITA involves considerable time and costs and that cases
"run, on average, several years and entail large costs for both claimants and
respondent States," 48 which presumably has a disparate impact on
developing states with fewer fiscal resources.
Meanwhile, NGOs generated controversy by publishing reports with
tantalizing headlines - sometimes with minimal support or unbalanced
representations - suggesting that ITA amounts to "[p]rofiting from
[i]njustice," since "agreeing to arbitration [means] states have indeed
accepted to be sued by the devil in hell." 49 Others have suggested ITA is a
"legal monster." 50 Against this backdrop, South Korea - which has over
45. John Nagel, Mexico Pays $16 Million to Metalclad,Ending First NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute, 24
Int'l Env. Rep. (BNA) 997 (Nov. 7, 2001); see also Teri L. Lilley, Keeping NAFTA "Green"forInvestors
and the Environment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 730 n.13 (2002).
46. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science, 30
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196, 202 (2012); see also Brower & Blanchard, supra note 5; Sebastian Perry,
Supporters of Investment Arbitration Launch EU Think Tank, GLOBAL ARB. REV., July 7, 2014,
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32780/supporters-investment-arbitration-launcheu-think-tank/.
47. UNCTAD, WIR 2012, supra note 4, at xxi, 88; see also UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note 1, at
110-17.

48. Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participationin Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16
REVIEW EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 230, 240 (2007).
49. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 5, at 3, 11; see also George Monbiot, This TransatlanticTrade
Deal Is a Full-FrontalAssault on Democraty, GUARDIAN: COMMENT IS FREE (Nov. 4, 2013, 3:31 PM),

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/201 3/nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assault-ondemocracy (suggesting ITA is a "monstrous assault").
50. See Mahnaz Malik, The Legal Monster that Lets Companies Sue Countries, GUARDIAN: COMMENT

Is
FREE
(Nov.
4,
2011,
2:23
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/201 1/nov/04/bilateral-investment-treaties;

PM),

EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 5; Discover the Dark Side of Investment, TRANSNATIONAL INST.
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seventy HAs with ITA provisions and no adverse awards - experienced
dramatic protests in November 2011 that even included physical fights and
51
the use of tear gas by legislators within the South Korean parliament.
One of the key issues of concern was, oddly, not the substantive
provisions of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, but rather, the
52
reciprocal right of investors to sue states in arbitration.
Some academics entered the fray in 2010 and issued a Public Statement.
They claim that ITA
is not a fair, independent, and balanced method for the resolution
of investment disputes and therefore should not be relied on for
this purpose. There is a strong moral as well as policy case for
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose
investor-state arbitration, including by refusal to pay arbitration
awards [rendered] against them .... 53
Another group of scholars opposing the creation of ITA in the TPP,
the multilateral free trade agreement among a dozen Asia-Pacific states,
argues that ITA should be abandoned to "reassert[ ] the integrity of our
domestic legal processes."5 4 The TTIP, involving a multilateral trade
55
agreement with the United States and Europe, is similarly contentious.
Some states have voted with their feet. Russia has withdrawn from the
Energy Charter Treaty after an investor established jurisdiction over
disputes related to the dissolution of Yukos Oil, potentially subjecting
Russia to over US$50 billion in damages. 56 Bolivia, Ecuador, and
(June 27, 2012), http://www.tni.org/article/discover-dark-side-investment; A Response to the Critics of
4,
2013),
EUR.
OBSERVATORY
(jan.
Injustice",
CORPORATE
"Profiting From
http://corporateeurope.org/blog/response-critics-profiing-injustice.
51. South Korea Passes US. Free-Trade Agreement, Lawmaker Sets off Tear Gas Canister in Protest,
FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter South Korea Passes US. Free-Trade Agreemend],
http://wwwfoxnews.com/world/2011 /11/22/south-korea-passes-us-free-trade-agreementlawmaker-sets-off-tear-gas-canister/; Alison Ross, Arbitration Clause Sparks Protests in Korea, GLOBAL
ARB. REV., Nov. 29, 2011, http://globalarbitrationreview.com/b/29995/.
52. See South Korea Passes US. Free-TradeAgreement, supra note 51.
53. Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the InternationalInvestment Regime, 8, Aug. 31, 2010,
availableat http://alainet.org/active/40578&lang=es; see also id. 14 (suggesting that investment treaty
disputes be resolved by national court judges). See generalyl Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 152-85 (2007) (stating ITA is "bias [edi in favour of allowing claims
and awarding damages against governments" and generally discussing aspects of this assertion). But
see William W Park, ArbitratorIntegri: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629,
658-59 (2009) (identifying concerns about perceived partiality of having national court judges
adjudicate disputes involving the state).
54. Elizabeth A. Evatt et al., An Open Letter from Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (May 8, 2012), available at
http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/.
55. See Jos Dings & Pieter de Pous, Letter to the Editor, As It Stands, the 77IP Could Threaten
Democray, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/d49b7bb6-94de-1le3-af7l00144feab7de.html.
56. See general#y Emmanuel Gaillard, Letter to the Editor, Russia Cannot Walk awayfrom its Legal
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Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention.5 7 The President
of Ecuador has claimed ICSID "signifies colonialism, slavery with respect
to transnationals, with respect to Washington, with respect to the World
Bank."5 8 In October 2012, Ecuador's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade
and Integration similarly called an ICSID award "unjust, illegal, illegitimate
59
and absurd."
Other dissatisfied stakeholders have encouraged the "reemergence of
the 'toothless' investment treaty" which, like older treaties of Friendship,
Navigation, and Commerce, provides substantive rights but no forum for
dispute resolution.60 Australia claimed that efficiency reasons warranted
rejecting ITA in future investment treaties. Having been threatened with
arbitration by Philip Morris for its plain packaging legislation for cigarettes,
Australia expressed concerns about costly and fractious disputes and the
net value of treaties as "the economic value of Australia's preferential
61
[IIAs] have been oversold."
Yet not all states agree. Some have made different decisions related to
the utility of ITA. In April 2012, after a contentious consultation process,
the United States crafted a model IIA that included streamlined
substantive and procedural rights and retained ITA.62 China also changed
its approach to ITA by broadening the scope of arbitration rights to permit

Obligations, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/c63d918a-8b8d-llde-9f5O00144feabdc.html#axzz3JLTCdwf8 (identifying Russia's announced withdrawal of the Energy
Charter Treaty).
57. See Diane Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivityof ICSID Denunciationand Proposalsfor Change, 11
J. INT'L BUS. & L. 239, 241-43 (2012) (identifying the denunciations of ICSID by Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Bolivia); Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and
Realiy, in THE BACKLASH, supra note 7, at xxxvii (discussing the fallout of the ITA backlash).
58. Trakman, supra note 23, at 604 (quoting ICSID in Crisis: Straight-Jacket or Investment Protection?,
BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (uly 10, 2009), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564878
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Charles N. Brower, The Evolution of the International
Judiiay."DenationalizationThrough JurisdictionalFragmentation, 103 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 171, 183
n.59 (2009) (providing same quote and stating that President "Correa referred to ICSID as an
'atrocity"' and that "withdrawal from [ICSID] was necessary for 'the liberation of our countries"').
59. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Human Mobility, Ecuador Will Require
Invalidation of Fault of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in
Favor of Occidental (Oct. 10, 2012) (Ecuador), available at http://cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-willrequire-invalidation-of-fault-of-the-international-center- for-setdement-of-investment-disputes-icsidinfavor-of-western-minister-ricardo-patino/?lang=en.
60. Riesenberg, supra note 38, at 980, 987; see also UNCTAD, WIR 2012, supra note 4, at 139-40;
Trakman, supra note 23.
61. Trakman, supra note 23, at 649-51 (discussing and quoting the Australian Productivity
Commission); see also DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT TRADE
POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY (2011) (Ausd.), available
at
http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fcOc-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/GillardGovernment-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx.
62. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Apr. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm.

28

[Vol. 55:1

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

arbitration on both the merits and damages of treaty claims. 63 Canada,
which has had its investors bring claims and has been a respondent,
retained its ITA mechanism when it revised its model 11A in 2003 in light
of its experience in NAFTA arbitration. 64 The May 2012 trilateral
investment treaty among China, Japan, and Korea retained ITA for dispute
settlement. 65 Even Australia, after a national election leading to a change in
66
government, included ITA in a treaty negotiated with South Korea.
Meanwhile, states continue to renegotiate investment treaties, and ITA
appears to be a viable dispute resolution option in the ongoing TPP and
67
TTIP negotiations.
Part of the debate about ITA derives from concerns about the
development dimension and whether ITA exhibits a bias against
developing states. The President of Bolivia, for example, has gone on
record suggesting that no country, except the United States, ever wins even though that assertion is empirically refutable. 68 Likewise, some
organizations focus on the number of claims brought against developing
states but do not necessarily provide holistic analyses of outcomes as a
function of development status. 69 Meanwhile, others take remarks out of
context without providing alternative analyses that demonstrate the
63. See Mark Feldman, Remarks, in Cbina-Afnca Investment Treaties and Dispute Settlement. A Piece of
the MultipolairPuzzle, 107 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 225,231, 231-32 (2013) (discussing the expansion

of aspects of China's investment treaty provisions); see also NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN,
CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE (2009).

64. See Canada's Foreign Investment Promotion and ProtectionAgreements (FIPAs), FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
TRADE & DEV. CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/fipa-apie/fipa-apie.aspx?lang=eng (last modified Nov. 4, 2013); Canada's FIPA Program: Its
Purpose,

Objective

and

Content,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

TRADE

&

DEV.

CAN.,

http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipapurpose.aspx?lang=en (last modified May 27, 2014).
65. Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea,
and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and
Protection
of
Investment,
May
13,
2012,
available
at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/201 2/5/pdfs/051301 l.pdf.
66. Press Release, Minister for Trade & Inv., Australia Concludes FTA Negotiations with the
Republic
of
Korea
(Dec.
5,
2013)
(Austl.),
available
at
http://trademinister.gov.au/releases/2013/ar..mr_-131205.html; Free Trade Agreement Between the
Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Korea arts. 11.15-11.28, [20141
ATNIF 4 (Austi.) (providing the text of the recendy negotiated Korea-Australia investment
agreement that provides for 1TA).
67. EU.Draft Text on ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences to U.S. Approach, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/PubicContent-World-Trade-Online/eu-draft-text-on-isds-contains-similarities-differences-to-usapproach/menu-id-896.html (suggesting the retention of ITA but possible variations in enforcement
mechanisms).
68. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 6, at 436.
69. UNCTAD, hA Issues Note 2012, supra note 29; see also UNCTAD, ILA Issues Nlote 2014, supra
note 4. But see Gallagher & Shrestha, supra note 6 (providing a more holistic explanation of potential
bias of ITA against developing states). The gap may derive from limited institutional resources in
international organizations.
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holistically harmful impact on developing states, 70 or they may have a
selective focus. 71 Nevertheless, given the potential impact on ITA's
legitimacy and its value as a neutral rule of law mechanism, arguable

problems related to development dimensions and ITA outcomes are a
serious matter worthy of focused and careful attention.
Earlier research was unable to establish a reliable link between the

outcomes of ITA disputes

and respondent states'

background. 72 Even when re-defining development -

spontaneously generated by critics all models.

73

developmental

using definitions

those null results were robust across

Concerns about the latent effect of development should not be
dismissed, however. It is possible that, over time, analyses could reveal
systematically biased outcomes. Yet, it is also possible that ITA outcomes
are a function of variables other than development - such as internal
domestic politics or some derivative variable. 74 Political science literature
supports the plausibility of this inference. Robust scholarship has
identified, for example, links between domestic political institutions and

investment stability and focuses on how democratic protections and other
70. See, e.g., DANIEL IKENSON, CATO INST., FREE TRADE BULLETIN NO. 57, A COMPROMISE TO
ADVANCE THE TRADE AGENDA: PURGE NEGOTIATIONS OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT (2014), availableat http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ftb57.pdf.
71. See Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study oJ
Investment Treaty Arbitration,50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211 (2012). For example, Professor Van Harten's
intriguing analysis of investment treaty outcomes that purports to find a pro-investor bias evaluates
only jurisdictional issues. Beyond the failure to control for awards that generate multiple issues and thus double or triple counting cases where the same tribunal addresses multiple issues - he fails
to account for ultimate outcomes of cases. Similarly, a recent study focusing primarily on "merit
awards" asserts that states win nearly 80% of reported disputes and consolidates types of outcomes.
CREDIBILITY CONSULTING LLC, STUDY OF DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE
SETTLEMENT

OF

INVESTMENT

DISPUTES

CASES

1

(2014),

available

at

http://www.credibilityconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Credibility-ICSID-DamagesStudy-June-2014-1.pdf. Holistic research demonstrates that while the majority of cases ultimately
generated outcomes favorable to states, those state-favorable outcomes occurred less frequently at
the jurisdictional phase and more frequently in merits and/or damages phases. See FRANCK, MYTHS
& REALITIES, supra note 14; see also Franck, Empirically Evaluating supra note 32, at 52-53 (providing
similar results in an earlier generation of research).
72. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 6.
73. Susan D. Franck et al., Through the Looking Glass: UnderstandingSocial Science NormsforAnaZing
InternationalInvestment Law, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 20102011, at 883 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012); see also Franck, ICSID Effect, supra note 14, at 875-93.
74. As the topic of the Symposium panel was the internal politics of host states and international
investment, this Article focuses on one readily measurable indicator of politics, namely scores related
to the host state's democracy. Politics and democracy need not be the focal points of analysis. Other
variables might include the lawyers involved in the process, investor identity, arbitrator background,
the nature of contested government activity, or some other permutation of factors; these factors
could be potentially more worthwhile than a focus on politics alone. See, e.g., FRANCK, MYTHS &
REALITIES, supranote 14 (conducting multiple analyses on variables associated with outcomes); Susan
D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Demystifring Investment Treay Arbitration Gan. 7, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (same).
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constraints on policymaking discretion are associated with lower economic
risk and higher investment levels. 75 Jeremy Caddel and Nathan M. Jensen
recently identified that executive branch action (rather than legislative or
76
judicial) spawned the vast majority of ITA disputes.
Yet the role of politics in investment activities - to say nothing of
investment dispute outcomes can be complicated. 77 Some scholars
suggest that investment levels are better under authoritarian regimes 78 or

that transitions to democratic institutions can detrimentally impact
investment levels. 79 This research suggests that democracy might inhibit
development or otherwise may be negatively related to positive investment
outcomes. Others argue the contrary and explain that democratic
institutions attract higher investment flows. 80 Similarly, recognizing the
potential for conflating effects of political regimes and political risk,
Jensen found that democratic regimes experienced lower political risk, as
witnessed by the lower pricing of political risk insurance premiums. 81 Still
others suggest that the degree of democratic government is unrelated to
investment levels, and the real phenomenon is that institutions within
democracies
impact investment levels and encourage
positive
investment outcomes.

82

When there is a link between political risk and the investment choices
of foreign entities, the question is whether realized state liability is likewise
75. Nathan M. Jensen et al., Unbundng the Relationship Between AuthoritarianLegislatures and Political
Risk, 44 BRIT.J. POL. SCI. 655 (2013).
76. Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M. Jensen, Which Host Government Actors Are Most Involved in Disputes
with Foreign Investors?, at 1, 2 (Vale Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Int'l Inv., Columbia FDI Perspectives
No. 120,2014).
77. See, e.g., ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990, at 146-53 (2000).

78. John R. Oneal, The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian Regimes, 47 POL. RES.

Q.

565

(1994).

79. Adam L. Resnick, Investors, Turbuence and Transition: Democratic Transition and Foreign Direct
Investment in Nineteen Developing Countries,27 INT'L INTERACTIONS 381 (2001).
80. See Quan Li & Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct
Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, 57 INT'L ORG. 175 (2003) (finding that democracy decreases
FDI flows, but only after controlling for the rule of law, where enhancing aspects can increase
investment flows but other aspects, like regular policy change or antitrust laws, reduce investment
flows); see also WITOLD JERZY HENISZ, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: MEASURING
RISKS AND PROTECTING PROFITS (2002); NATHAN M. JENSEN, NATION-STATES AND THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

(2006); Matthias Busse & Carsten Hefeker, PolticalRisk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment, 23
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 397 (2007); Phillipp Harms & Heinrich W Ursprung, Do Civil and Political
Repression Really Boost ForeignDirect Investments?, 40 ECON. INQUIRY 651 (2002).
81. Nathan Jensen, PoliticalRirk, DemocraticInstitutions, andForeign DirectInvestment, 70 J. POL. 1040
(2008).

82. Glen Biglaiser & Joseph L. Staats, Do PolticalInstitutionsAffect ForeignDirectInvestment? A Survy
of U.S. Corporationsin Latin America, 63 POL. RES. Q. 508 (2010); Tim Biithe & Helen V. Milner, The
Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade
Agreements?, 52 AM.J. POL. SCL 741 (2008).
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driven by political factors or something else, such as tribunal animus
against developing nations or a preference for relieving developed states
of liability.
Ultimately, the debate about ITA is a live issue with political and
economic ramifications. Claims of improper systemic bias are worth
addressing, as outcomes untethered to legal merits and based purely upon
a state's development levels provide a legitimate basis for critiquing dispute
resolution. Yet, should stakeholders wish to have a debate based upon
evidence, a balanced understanding of ITA's functionality is necessary.
This requires data, gathered using sound ex ante research protocols that
derive from established social science practices to inform the debate and
the normative choices on the appropriate form of dispute resolution.
III. METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

This research used archival data8 3 to explore the potential links between
the democracy levels of respondent states, the development levels of the
respondent states, and ITA outcomes. The objective of the quantitative
analysis was to explore potential reliable statistical relationships, identifying
whether ITA favors respondents from the developed or developing world
and how a respondent state's political institutions might (or might not)
serve as an explanatory variable for outcomes.
A. Unit of Anaysis
The unit of analysis was ITA awards that were publicly available as of
January 1, 2012. This included all public awards irrespective of the
language rendered, which necessarily included awards rendered in English,
Spanish, and French. The method for gathering publicly available awards
was the same methodology used in previous research.8 4 As there is no
single agreed-upon repository for ITA awards, the primary source of the
public awards derived from Professor Andrew Newcombe's website,
ITAlaw.com.

85

This was supplemented and cross-checked using a number

of resources, including the UNCTAD website, the ICSID website, and the
86
ICSID Review, among others.
83. The data derives from a larger research project. See FRANCK, MYTHS & REALITIES, supra note
14. This Article abbreviates the methodology and incorporates those provisions as if fully set forth
herein. The data from the larger project will be made publicly available upon publication; in the
interim, data from pre-2007 cases already is available. See Generation 1 Dataset and Related Materials,
WASHINGTON & LEE SCH. OF LAW, http://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/page.asp?pageid=1185 (last
accessed Jan. 22, 2015).
84. Franck, EmpiicalyEvalualing, supra note 32, at 16-20.
85. SeeAbout ita, ITA, http://www.italaw.com/about (last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
86. See Database of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (reduced version), UNCTAD,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISDS.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2015) (limited UNCTAD database
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International arbitration, depending in part on the applicable law,
experiences variations in the formal doctrinal definition of "award" and
the distinguishing types of tribunal activity from other aspects of
arbitration proceedings. Awards - namely elements of cases that resolve
dispositive key legal issues - under the ICSID Convention 87 or under the
UNCITRAL Model Law 88 have specific but slightly different meanings.
As the research cuts across ITA disputes, irrespective of whether cases
were rendered at ICSID under the ICSID Convention or the Additional
Facility Rules or some other forum under the New York Convention, the
research adopted a precise definition of "award." Namely, it defined an
"award" as a tribunal's written document that made a binding decision on
one of the four substantive phases of an arbitration or another decision
that was otherwise dispositive, namely awards on: (1) jurisdiction; (2)
merits; (3) damages; (4) allocation of costs; or (5) settlement agreements or
other orders indicating a dismissal or discontinuance. 89 This means that
other decisions that might generally provide information or provide
insights into the larger dispute resolution process - including interim
measures, decisions on confidentiality and transparency, place of
arbitration, arbitrator challenges, tribunals' interpretive decisions, ad hoc
Annulment Committees, and subsequent decisions by national courts were not generally coded. Disputes with only a public dispute notice or
request for arbitration were also omitted.
There are three elements that must be kept in mind when understanding
the dataset, the unit of analysis, and derivative inferences.
First, the dataset is a time-bounded population of ITA disputes that
were derived from public awards. This feature necessarily means that it is
available while full database undergoes redesign); Cases, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES

[ICSID],

https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx (last visited Jan.
7, 2015) (searchable database of ICSID awards). For print versions of ICSID cases, see, e.g., 16
ICSID Rep. (lames Crawford & Joanna Gomula eds., 2012). Likewise, certain cases at the SCC are
accessible through its website, http://english.chamber.se/, or the Stockholm InternationalArbitration
Review. The availability of public awards was crosschecked against other sources, including websites
requiring a subscription, like the APPLETON-ISR database on Westlaw, the Oxford University Press
website,
http://oxia.ouplaw.com/home/ic,
and
the
Investor-State
Law
Guide,
http://www.investorstatelawguide.com/. The author also consulted NAFTAclaims.com for cases

arising under NAFTA.
87. ICSID Convention, supra note 17, art. 48 (defining an award); ICSID, Rules of Procedurefor
ArbitrationProceedhngs (ArbitrationRules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, at 119-

21, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (2006) (providing in rules 41 and 43-45 for preliminary objections related
to jurisdiction and other orders for discontinuances, settlements, or party inaction).
88. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION arts. 17-17J,

U.N. Sales No. E.08.V4 (2008) (defining interim measures as awards capable of enforcement and
defining other enforceable awards).
89. This methodology is similar to other research analyzing ICSID awards addressing jurisdiction,
merits, settlements, or other orders for discontinuances. Daphna Kapeliuk, CollegialGames: Ana4bing
the Effect of PanelCompositionon Outcome in InvestmentArbitration,31 REV. LITIG. 267, 302 (2012).
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possible that the population has continued to evolve, and the external
validity of this research is arguably limited. For example, awards rendered

after January 2012 generate variance in the population. Yet, the analysis in
this Article inevitably provides a core baseline for future consideration. It
is possible for ITA to change over time, and replication is critical.
Second, private awards may differ meaningfully from public awards,
thereby limiting the value of inferences. The growth of the current dataset
identified a small number of cases that were previously private but
ultimately entered the public domain. There did not appear to be
meaningful differences between previously non-public and public awards,

and there was rough parity in parties, claims, arbitrators, and outcomes. In
any event, it is not clear that case selection bias skews the data. Irrespective
of whether investors or states were successful, both have incentives to
disclose awards. Investors, for example, may disclose awards because

shareholders may positively view the information that the investor won a
claim against a state and created greater commercial certainty. Likewise,
states may believe that notifying the public that they have won a case will
restore confidence in the government, will be of political utility, or will

promote the confidence of other foreigners investing in the country.
Third, other investment-related

conflicts

were not coded. These

conflicts related to either formalized investment treaty disputes without
reliable publicly available information or conflicts that never crystalized
into formal disputes.90 As Professor Michael Reisman explains, given the

"very large" scope of international investment, the 80,000 multinational

enterprises and their 100,000 affiliates, and the possibility of claims under

2,700+ treaties, "the number of actual disputes going to arbitration seems
to be a miniscule fraction of the universe" of investment and investment
90. There are two categories of formalized disputes that were not analyzed. First, ITA disputes
like those listed on the ICSID website - may be in the pipeline but
with a dispute notice
constitute disputes about which there is public knowledge. Yet the inability to reliably assess case
information without a verifiable legal record leads to omission, as even where ICSID publicly
registers a case, it does not indicate whether the case involves a breach of treaty, domestic contract
law, or domestic investment law. Second, there could be latent, non-formalized investment disputes.
Investment-related problems arise every day, and the author is aware of no datasets measuring the
full scope of investment treaty conflict lurking beyond formal disputes. States may implement
Dispute Prevention Policies to eliminate or minimize conflicts leading to formal dispute notices, or
parties may use alternative dispute resolution strategies - like negotiation, mediation, or ombuds to address conflicts prior to an investor submitting a formal dispute notice. Similarly, after client
counseling and exploring the costs and benefits of dispute resolution options, (1) an investor might
abandon its claim or seek alternative commercial redress, or (2) a state may address a disputed
measure or otherwise redress state activity. See Washington and Lee University and UNCTAD Joint
Symposium on International Investment and Alternative Dispute Resolution, Mar. 29, 2010, InvestorDoc.
to
Arbitration I1, UNCTAD
State
Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (2011) [hereinafter Investor-State Disputes]. The dataset therefore
focuses on the tip of the iceberg of investment-treaty conflict, and the full range of unreported and
informal disputes is likely larger and unknowable.
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conflict.91 By focusing on public arbitration awards, the research
necessarily omits a larger context. It is, however, necessary to narrow the
field of inquiry to generate a careful, yet contained, analysis of the
information that is both reliable and available.
B. Generation of the Dataset
The current dataset grew from earlier research from 2006 ("Generation
1" or "GI" research). The five additional years of data expanded the
number of publicly available awards by approximately 250% and increased
the number of cases by 300%.92 Using a Codebook of more than 100
pages, multiple coders coded raw data from the award with an initial 94.7%
rate of inter-coder agreement. All divergences were then resolved in intercoder reliability meetings, and a mutually acceptable code was agreed. The
hope was that the rigor of the coding and the use of common standards in
the Codebook would ensure that the underlying data were reliable, would
minimize the risk of error, and would enhance the value of the data and
related analyses.
C. Methodology and Variables
One of the most challenging aspects of social science is measurement
validity, namely, finding a measure to capture the nature of the social
phenomenon in which a researcher is interested. "It may be the case that
the variable being explained cannot be measured accurately, either because
of data collection difficulties or because it is inherently unmeasurable and
a proxy variable must be used in its stead." 93 No attempt at
operationalizing a variable will be perfect "because there are an infinite
number of physical characteristics that might be addressed in any
definition"; so, rather than striving for unattainable perfection,
"researchers try to produce definitions that are adequate to permit a
94
replication of all important respects by another researcher."
In compliance with social science protocols, this Article first identifies
three variables that required transformation from raw coding, specifically,
91. W Michael Reisman, InternationalInvestment Arbitration and ADR.- Marriedbut Best Living Apart,
24 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 185, 186 (2009).

92. Coding occurred in three different time periods. G1 data were collected from the beginning
of ITA until June 1, 2006. Generation 2 ("G2") data were collected from public awards between June
1, 2006, and June 1, 2009. Generation 3 ("GY) data were collected from awards within the public
domain between June 1, 2009, and January 1, 2012. G2 and G3 data collection also looked for awards
that, although once private, had become public. There was always at least one coder involved in
earlier coding. All coders received extensive training by coding a core set of materials and using the
Codebook for usually around four weeks prior to coding the live data.
93. PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 3 (5th ed. 2003).
94. MILDRED L. PATTEN, UNDERSTANDING RESEARCH METHODS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ESSENTIALS 17 (7th ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted).
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definitions of development, politics, and fiscal amounts. Then, it defines
how "outcomes" were operationalized.
1. Development Status
Defining "Development Status" is a perpetual challenge. 95 There is no
consistent legal definition of this concept, and development can mean
different things to different people. For example, the World Trade
Organization does not offer a precise measurement for development.
Rather, it permits member states to self-define development, 96 which has
caused inconsistency and confusion in areas such as international
environmental law. 97 Without a predefined or exclusive measure for a legal
phenomenon, it becomes necessary to use measures from "judgments
made for entirely different purposes by other researchers,"'98 so as to minimize
selection and self-serving biases.
Similar to earlier research, 99 this research used two measures for
development from established indexes. Out of an abundance of caution,
this research used a third measure designed by an expert and reputable
international organization.
First, development was operationalized as a binary categorical
variable - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) status - that derived from state membership in the OECD at
the date of the award. OECD membership is generally, but not always,
associated with higher levels of development, and therefore is a blunt
proxy for development. States become OECD members through a
complicated accession process designed to demonstrate a willingness to
embrace a market economy, democratic pluralism, and respect for human
95. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/ World Trade OrganiZation Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 723 n.4, 726 (2003)
(analyzing development dimensions in GATT disputes and observing the difficulty in making
distinctions between developed and developing states).
96. See Who Are the Developing Countries in the WFTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/devel-e/dlwhoe.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) ("There are
no WTO definitions of 'developed' and 'developing' countries. Members announce for themselves
whether they are 'developed' or 'developing' countries."); Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal
Exceptionalismin InternalionalLaw,52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 32 n.159 (2011) ("WTO rules do not contain
a definition of a 'developing country' Instead, states self-designate themselves as developed or
developing countries as part of a political calculus."); see also Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing
Country Access to WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 CHI-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 130, 132-33 (2009)
(acknowledging the elasticity of defining developing countries); Andrew D. Mitchell & Joanne Wallis,
Pacfic Pause: The Rhetoric of Special & Differential Treatment, the Reality of IPTO Accession, 27 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 663, 696-97 (2009) (categorizing developing countries).
97. Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy Through Separation?: Environmental Law and the -BasicLaw of
Hong Kong, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231, 261-62 (1998).
98. GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 157 (1994) (emphasis in original).

99. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 6; Franck, ICSID Effect, supranote 14.
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rights. 100 Although OECD membership has been fairly stable, 101 the
possibility of change was addressed by coding for OECD membership on
the date of the award, which was the date for other critical variables (i.e.,
currency conversions and inflation adjustments).102
Second, development was also operationalized using a four-category
variable - World Bank Status - that derived from a World Bank
classification system grouping states as High Income, Upper-Middle
Income, Lower-Middle Income, and Low Income. 103 The World Bank's
main criterion for classifying economies is gross national income per
capita.' 04 As World Bank classifications can and did change over time,
World Bank Status was coded at the award date. 105
Third, development status was operationalized using a continuous
variable - HDI Status - derived from the United Nations Development
Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). Developed by
Mahbub ul-Haq and Amartya Sen to shift conceptions of development,
the HDI evaluates elements including life expectancy, education, and
income. HDI is a continuous variable and ranges from 0.0 (undeveloped)
to 1.0 (completely developed). 06 Reflecting that states' HDI scores could
shift over time, HDI scores were coded using the date of the award. 107
100. Jan Wouters & Sven Van Kerckhoven, The OECD and the G20: An Ever Closer Relationshb?,43
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 345 (2011).
101. See List of OECD Member Countries - Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited Nov.
12, 2014).
102. This meant, for example, that in the jurisdictional decision in CSOB v. Slovak Republic (1999)
that terminated the ITA dispute, Slovakia was coded as "0" to reflect that it was not an OECD
member; but in Eureko v. Slovak Republic (2010), Slovakia was coded as "1" to reflect its December
2000 accession to OECD membership.
103. The World Bank uses specific means to classify and codify information. See Data: County and
Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups (last
visited Nov. 12, 2014); Data: What Is the World Bank Atlas Method?, WORLD BANK,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378832-what-is-the-world-bank-adasmethod (lastvisited Nov. 12, 2014).
104. Data: How
Does the
World Bank
ClaEi
Countries?, WORLD
BANK,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bankclassify-countries (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).
105. This meant, for example, that in Louder v. Czech Republic (2001), the Czech Republic was
coded as an Upper-Middle Income state; but in Phoenix Action v. Czech Repubic (2009), the Czech
Republic was coded as High Income. Similarly, in EnCana v. Ecuador(2004), Ecuador was coded as a
Lower-Middle Income state; but in Murphy v. Ecuador (2010), Ecuador was coded as an Upper-Middle
Income state.
106. See general# Human Development Reports: About Human Development, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME
[UNDP], http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (describing the evolution of
the HDI measure); see also UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: SUSTAINABILITY AND
EQUALTY.
A
BETrER
FUTURE
FOR
ALL
(2011),
available
at
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/271/hdr201 1-en complete.pdf
(applying
the
measure). As the methodology for coding HDI changed in 2011 and was applied to all the data
retroactively, previously published Human Development Reports were not used to code HDI levels.
The research used data directly provided by Dr. Milorad Kovacevic, Chief Statistician at the Human
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2. Politics and Democracy
A state's political structure involves more than evaluation of a state's
formal name.10 8 Although the scale has a potentially narrow definition of
democracy, the dataset transformed a state's respondent political system
using a preexisting scale commonly used by political scientists. 109
Using the date of the award, the respondent state was ranked pursuant
to the Polity IV index. Polity IV is designed to identify the political regime
of a state. Polity contains information on countries with a population of
more than 500,000 people. The index places states on a scale in which
states with more authoritarian and autocratic regimes have lower Polity
scores, and states with more democratic regimes have higher scores.1 10

3. FiscalAmounts
Some raw data were transformed using either preexisting scales offered
by independent organizations or established statistical protocols. First,
using the date the award was rendered, amounts claimed and awarded were
converted to a common currency of U.S. Dollars. Second, data were
adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index on a common
date."' Third, fiscal data that exhibited unacceptable statistical skewing

were transformed to reduce skewing, to ensure that the data matched the
assumptions of the underlying statistical tests, and to enhance statistical
conclusion validity. 12
Development Report Office of the United Nations Development Programme. All of the scores Dr.
Kovacevic provided used the updated 2011 methodology to reevaluate the historical and current
rankings of states.
107. This meant, for example, in Tradex Hellas v. Albania (1996), Albania's HDI Status was 0.662;
but in Pantechniki v. Albania (2009), Albania's HDI Status was 0.734. Likewise, in Sedelmayer v. Russian
Federation (1998), Russia had an HDI Status of 0.677; but in RosInvestCo v. Russian Federation (2010),
Russia had an HDI Status of 0.751. In Loewen v. United States (2001), the United States' HDI Status
was 0.898, and it was similar (0.906) in Glamis Gold v. United States (2009).
108. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul E Diehl, Caution in What You Wish for: The Consequences of a
Right to Democracy, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 289, 291 (2012).
109. Id. at 291 ("The Polity IV Project [is] the most widely used scholarly database on democracy
and authoritarianism .... "); see also David. S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 863, 926 (2013); Sergey Mityakov et al., InternationalPolitics and Import Diversification, 56 J.L. &
ECON. 1091 (2013) (using the Polity IV dataset); Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND.
L.J. 1133 (2014) (same).
110. See Polity IV Project, Polio IV Individual County Regime Trends, 1946-2013, CTR. FOR
SYSTEMIC PEACE [CSP] & INTEGRATED NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last updated June 6, 2014); The Poliy Project About
Poliy, CSP, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). Coding in
this Article used 2012 scores prior to the release of the 2013 Polity IV data.
111. The Codebook contains detailed procedures for how fiscal data, whether or not in U.S.
Dollars, should be converted to U.S. currency using the date of the award.
112. For example, winsorizing involves identifying and converting extreme values in data into the
upper or lower bounds of the distribution of the normal curve. Franck, Development and Outcomes,
supra note 6, at 456 n. 16 (citing W.J. Dixon, Smplified Estimationfrom Censored Normal Samples, 31
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4. Defining Outcomes
There are also thorny definitional issues about what it means to "win"
and whether outcomes should be viewed through objective fiscal measures
or subjective measures of satisfaction. Using subjective definitions of a
"win" creates confusion as to what is being measured, injects variance, and
impedes the reliable measurement of outcomes. Indeed, some investors
who received financial compensations from states nevertheless subjectively
viewed the outcome as a "loss."113 Others suggest, even if a state is not
liable, the mere existence of the claim is a "loss" to the state.'1 4 Still others
might classify a settlement as a "loss" - even where parties reached an
agreed outcome - because not everyone obtained everything they
wanted." 5 The net result is that the measurement of a "win" or "loss" is
both complex and emotionally evocative.
Recognizing the strong reactions to defining a "win" or a "loss," relying
on parties' subjective experiences is likely to be unreliable and lead to
invalid measures that are not generalizable. An objective, fiscally based
metric offers a better opportunity to assess ITA through a single lens. This
research therefore used an objective, verifiable measure - namely an
award's dispositifthat describes the award's core decisions - as the basis for
categorizing whether a tribunal both identified a compensable breach of
international law and provided any derivative damage assessment.
Given the lack of an agreed definition, this research used a nuanced
approach to outcomes. The objective was to use multiple measures to
provide three discrete proxies. First, it analyzed each case's ultimate
outcome in terms of whether the tribunal awarded the investor any funds,
whether the respondent avoided fiscal damage for a treaty breach, or
whether the parties settled or otherwise discontinued the case. Excluding
settlements, outcome was coded as a binary categorical variable as either a

ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 385, 385 (1960); John W Tukey, The Future of Data Analysis, 33
ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 1, 18-19 (1962)). Transformations using natural logs and

logarithmic transformation can also constructively minimize skewing. DAVID HOWELL, STATISTICAL
METHODS FOR PSYCHOLOGY 347-52 (8th ed. 2013); see also Franck, ICSID Effect, supra note 14, at
853 n.132 (using logarithmic transformations); infra note 139 (discussing winsorized data).
113. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A
Prehminay Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 8-9 (2005) (referring to remarks by Grant
Kesler, former CEO of Metalclad, who successfully recovered over US$16 million from Mexico).
114. See Filip De Ly, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration?Are Investors and Host States
on a Level Playing Field?: The Lauder/Czech Republic Legagy, 6 J. WORLD INV.& TRADE 69, 69 (2005);
SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, FOOD & WATER WATCH, CHALLENGING CORPORATE
INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK'S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE POWER
AND
WHAT
TO
Do
ABOUT
IT
ix,
4
(2007),
available
at

http://wwwfoodandwaterwatch.org/doc/ICSID-print.pdf.
115. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 5, at 9, 13,22,30, 58.
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respondent "win" or "loss."

116

Second, recognizing that a raw "win" or

"loss" hides the degree of damage, the research used a continuous variable
to code the amount awarded (if any) against the respondent, including
settlements and discontinuances. Third, as the prior two definitions did not
address relative success, another measure of outcome used a continuous
variable that calculated the percentage of investors' relative success by
comparing amounts investors claimed and were ultimately awarded
against states.
5. Methodology
For analyses involving two categorical variables, the analyses used a
Pearson's Chi-Square Test of Independence (X) to identify the presence
of meaningful patterns of relationship. Similarly, when analyzing a twolevel categorical and a continuous variable, an independent samples t-test
explored group differences; tests with multi-level categorical variables and
a continuous variable used a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) (F)
to compare group differences. For continuous variables, a Pearson
product-moment correlation co-efficient (r) evaluated potential linear
correlations between variables.11 7 A partial correlation (r) measured the
degree of association between two variables while eliminating and
controlling for the effect of a third variable.
D. Research Hypotheses
The research explored three independent groups of questions. First,
what link did respondent development status independently have to
outcome? Second, what was the relationship between development status
and democracy? Third, controlling for the effect of a respondent state's
democracy levels, was there any link between the state's development
status and outcomes?
In keeping with previous research, the research hypothesis was that
neither development status nor democracy levels would affect outcome.
The theoretical assumption was that international adjudicative processes
should not depend upon variables related to development or political
institutions but should instead be a function of neutral adjudication based
upon facts and law. A legitimate alternative research hypothesis would have
been that either development status or democracy level was reliably linked

116. Like previous research, the respondent was coded as the ultimate winner if the tribunal
awarded $0 for a treaty breach, and the respondent did not win if the tribunal awarded more than $0
for a breach. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 6, at 456.
117. See TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLSH 79, 93, 105, 161 (3d ed. 2010)
(explaining use of statistical tests).
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to outcome. As ITA can evolve, 18 it is useful to re-test hypotheses and
initial findings against updated data. Replication through expanded analysis
also permits assessment of new variables, including whether a state's
political institutions generate compensable economic risk.
IV

RESEARCH RESULTS

This Part describes the results of the statistical analysis. Subpart A
provides an assessment of outcomes as a function of development status.
Subpart B assesses the link between development and democracy that may
have conflated the results in Subpart A. Subpart C then reconsiders the
link between outcomes and development status - but only after
controlling for the effect of a respondent's level of democracy.
A. Development Status and Outcomes
The first hypothesis involves looking for outcomes as a function of
development status. Outcomes were analyzed as a function of: (1) a binary
win-loss approach; (2) amounts awarded; and (3) relative success.
1. Win or Loss and Development
A first set of tests evaluated the relationship between overall outcome
(i.e., a raw win or loss) and respondent development status. No test was
able to ascertain a reliable link between outcomes and development status.
An analysis of only the World Bank classification, however, suggested that
there may be a latent effect, whereby High Income or Lower-Middle
Income states fared better than Upper-Middle or Low Income respondent
states. Otherwise, irrespective of how development status was defined, it
was not possible to identify a reliable pattern of relationship between
whether a state won or lost ITA and its development status.
First, a 2x2 Chi-Square cross-tabulation analyzed the 144 cases with
final decisions to see if there was a statistically significant pattern of
relationship between a respondent's OECD status and winning or losing
the ITA. As hypothesized and indicated by previous research, there was no
statistically meaningful pattern of relationship between respondent OECD
status and outcome of the dispute (X2(1)=1 .5 9 8 ; p=.2 1; r-.10; n=144).
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the outcomes and indicates that,
irrespective of whether the respondent was from an OECD or nonOECD state, respondents won more than claimants.

118. Susan D. Franck, The Public International Law Regime Governing International
Investment. By Josi E. Alvare. The Hague: Hague Academ'y of InternationalLaw, 2011. Pp.502. $25, 18,
106 AM. J. INT'L L. 890 (2012) [hereinafter Franck, Review] (reviewing ALVAREZ, supra note 11).
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Table 1: Breakdown of Respondent State' OECD Status and Ulimate Outcome in
FinalITA Cases
Claimant Win
Respondent Win
Total
OECD
14
30
44
Non-OECD
43
57
100
Total
57
87
144
Thepattern was not statisically significantat the .05, .01, or.001 levels.

Although OECD states facially won in a slightly higher proportion, it
was not statistically meaningful. Given the statistically small effect size
(r.10),119 the test was underpowered, and a sample of more than 600
additional cases would be required to reach the conclusion that there is no
effect for OECD status on outcome. 120 In the interim, the results are
further evidence that OECD status was not reliably linked to outcome.
Table 2: Breakdown of Respondent State' World Bank Status and Ultimate
Outcome in FinalITA Cases
Claimant Win
Respondent Win
Total
High Income
4
18
22
Upper-Middle Income
31
35
66
Lower-Middle Income
16
29
45
Low Income
6
5
11
Total
57
87
144
The pattern was not statisticaly significantat the .05, .01, or .001 levels.
A second model conducted a 2x4 Chi-Square cross-tabulation to
identify the effect of World Bank development status on outcome. As
hypothesized and indicated by previous research, there was no statistically
meaningful pattern of relationship between respondent World Bank status
and which party won the dispute (X2(3)=7.054; p=.07; r-.22; n=144). Table
2 provides a breakdown of outcome as a function of development status.
119. See LOUIS COHEN ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN EDUCATION 113-16 (6th ed. 2007)

(providing Cohen's conventions for understanding effect sizes and indicating a "small" effect is
present when r-.10, a "medium" effect is present when r-.30, and a "large" effect is present when
r-.50, whereas effect sizes below r-.10 are less than "small" and arguably of trivial impact).
120. See JACOB COHEN ET AL., STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL

SCIENCES 3-6, 115 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining how to conduct a priori power analyses); Franck,
Development and Outcomes, supra note 6, at 461 n.132 (explaining Cohen's power analysis in ITA). The
post hoc power of an analysis is determined by using power tables to estimate the probability of
committing a Type II error (Type II error rate = 1 - power). As the power of the OECD analysis is
small (r < .10 and n= 144), there is theoretically a 70-80% risk of having incorrectly determined that
there is no relationship. In those situations where there is less than a "small" effect, the social science
literature does not generally perceive a power problem, because the non-significant potential effect is
small. An aprioripower analysis for an effect size of .10 (S=781) would require a sample of 781 final
investment treaty cases to have a sufficient number in the two OECD conditions. Thus, in order to
establish the generally accepted baseline of .80 power (i.e., a 20% risk of a Type II error), this study
would require an additional 637 cases beyond the 144 analyzed here.
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It indicates that, overall, states and investors won at roughly equal levels or
that respondents generally won more.
Yet the model was on the cusp of significance and somewhat
underpowered, indicating that it is not appropriate to conclude that a
respondent's World Bank status had no relationship to outcomes.
Although there was a facial disparity, whereby both High Income and
Lower-Middle Income states experienced more advantageous results when
compared to Upper-Middle and Low Income states, it is not yet possible
to determine whether the pattern was attributable to other variable(s) or
random chance alone. 121 In the interim, it was noteworthy that states either
won in roughly equivalent levels to investors or fared slightly better than
investors overall; furthermore, there was never a sub-category of state
development levels where investors won in higher proportions than states.
A third model analyzed the impact of outcomes and HDI status. A ttest analyzed the relationship between whether investors or states won ITA
and the states' HDI scores. The results failed to identify a statistically
significant effect of HDI on ITA outcomes (t(141)=-.779; p=.44; r=.07;
n=143). 122 The mean HDI score for cases where investors won was .715
(n=57; standard deviation (SD)=.118), and the mean HDI for cases where
states won was .730 (n=86; SD=.112). To contextualize scores using the
2013 UNDP report on HDI, both successful and unsuccessful
respondents were in the low end of the "high human development"
category; the average unsuccessful state was scored similarly to Sri Lanka
(.715), and the average successful state was scored similarly to Brazil
or Jamaica (.730).123
Although the mean HDI score for successful states was facially higher
by .015 than unsuccessful states, the difference was not statistically reliable.
Given the trivial effect size (r<.10), it is possible the test was not
underpowered; yet lack of power is a risk, and more than 600 additional
cases would be required to conclude definitively that there was no link
between HDI and ITA outcomes. 124 In the interim, the results provide
121. With the small-medium effect size and the 144 cases analyzed, the analysis has 60-70%
power. An a priori power analysis for an effect size of .22 (r-.20; S=191) indicates 382 final
investment treaty cases (N=n(181/2) * k(4)) are required to have a sufficient power for the four
World Bank conditions to reliably exclude the possibility of an effect. This necessitates an additional
238 final cases or a roughly 250% increase in the historical caseload.
122. One case, Apetrol v.A.erbaijan (2009), was omitted from the HDI analysis, as an HDI score
for Azerbaijan was unavailable.
123. UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: THE RISE OF THE SOUTH: HUMAN
PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD, at 144-45 (2013), available at

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2Ol3_encomplete.pdf.
124. The post hoc power analysis yields a 70-80% risk of a Type II error (Type II error rate = 1 power) because of the small effect size (r=.07). An apriori power analysis for an effect size of .10
(S=781) requires 781 final investment treaty cases to generate 80% power, which necessitates 637
additional cases to establish the requisite power.
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further evidence that respondent development status was not reliably
linked to outcome.
2. Amounts Awarded and Development
The data related to amounts awarded was mixed. Unlike the binary
win/loss variable, or even relative success, the amounts awarded did not
generate uniform results about the link between amounts awarded and
state development status. Models that defined development as OECD or
HDI status were unable to ascertain a reliable link with outcome. In
contrast, models using the World Bank classification did identify a
meaningful difference in amounts awarded as a function of development.
The key distinction in that model was that High Income states experienced
comparatively lower amounts awarded than only their Upper-Middle
Income counterparts. This Subpart therefore explores amounts
awarded - both overall and for the subset of investor wins - by
analyzing relationships between different measures of development status.
(a) Awards as a Function of OECD Status
A first set of models analyzed amounts awarded as a function of the
respondent's OECD status. Both models indicated, irrespective of
whether the focus was all final awards or only the subset of investor wins,
that it was not possible to identify a reliable relationship between OECD
status and amounts awarded.
For the set of all awards, three tests failed to identify a statistically
significant link between OECD status and amount awarded. The first test
used inflation-adjusted raw data with statistical outliers (t(157)=.698;
p=.49; r-.06; n=159); a second test used winsorized data (t(157)=1.371;
p=.17; r-.11; n=159) to minimize the impact of skewing and match the
statistical assumptions of the test, but still used readily understandable U.S.
Dollar amounts; and the third test used logged data (t(1,157)=1.4l4;p=.1 6;
r-.11; n=159) with the least degree of skewing. Table 3 provides the mean
amounts tribunals awarded against OECD and non-OECD states using
inflation-adjusted winsorized data. 125 Although there was a facial pattern
suggesting that the non-OECD states experienced somewhat larger awards
than their OECD counterparts, that pattern was not reliable and could
derive from random chance.

125. Winsorized data were presented because winsorizing offers data in U.S. Dollar values, which
is a meaningful scale with practical significance, and it had the lowest levels of skewing for data in
U.S. Dollars.
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Table 3: Amounts Awarded in Final ITA Cases Using Inflation-Adjusted
Winsofied Damagesas a Function of Reipondent State OECD Membership
Respondent
SD
Total
State
Mean U.S. Dollar Award
2,176,168
4,250,501
49
OECD
110
3,295,176
4,958,055
Non-OECD
4,766,128
159
Total
2,950,324
The pattern was not stalisticalysignificantat the .05,. 0 1, or.001 levels.
For the subset of those awards where investors were successful, it was
not possible to identify a reliable link between OECD status and amounts
awarded. This held true across three tests using inflation-adjusted raw
(t(56)=.057; p=.96; r<.01; n=58), winsorized (t(56)=.564; p=.58; r-.08;
n=58), and logged (t(56)=.330; p=.74; r=.04; n=58) data. For this subset,
the mean amount awarded against OECD states using winsorized data was
US$34.6 million (SD=52,705,728; n=14), whereas the mean award against
126
non-OECD states was US$44.5 million (SD=58,722,315; n=44).
Although the raw inflation-adjusted data include statistical outiers,127
Figure 1 reflects the variance in amounts awarded as a function of whether
the respondent was an OECD or non-OECD state. The thick black line,
representing the median, indicates that when either an OECD or nonOECD state lost a case, the median amounts awarded were of a similar
value and under US$40 million. This is reflected by the inflation-adjusted
raw data. For OECD states, the median amount awarded was
US$8,295,911.128 For non-OECD states, the median amount awarded was
US$11,878,972.129 Figure 1 also reflects that although the highest quartile
for non-OECD states was slightly higher than OECD states, both groups
experienced statistical outliers.

126. Out of an abundance of caution, a Mann-Whitney U-test evaluated median differences
between two groups. Using inflation-adjusted raw data, that test also failed to reveal a meaningful
group difference between median awards of OECD and non-OECD states in all cases (U=2363.0;
p=.15) and the subset of investor wins (U=284.0;p=.66).
127. Although all test results were provided to address commentary on earlier research expressing
confusion about why some analyses were omitted, the tests with logged data had the greatest
statistical conclusion validity for analyzing amounts awarded. For the set of all awards, the skewing
of raw data was 3.94, 1.21 for winsorized data, and .639 for logged data (SE=.19). For the subset of
awards where investors won, the skewing was 2.16 for raw data, 1.47 for winsorized data, and -.72 for
logged data (SE=.31).
128. Using inflation-adjusted raw data, the lowest quartile of amounts awarded against OECD
states was US$3,750,878, and the highest quartile was US$47,718,081.
129. Using inflation-adjusted raw data, the lowest quartile of amounts awarded against nonOECD states was US$3,357,419, and the highest quartile was US$78,045,296.
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Figure 1: Stem-and-Leaf Plot of Damages Awarded Using Raw Inflation-Adjusted
Datafor Subset of FinalITA Cases Generating Payment to Investor as a Function
of RespondentStates OECD Status
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Although non-OECD states experienced slightly higher amounts
awarded overall in the subset of investor wins, those results were not
statistically meaningful. The effect sizes for all models were statistically
small (r-.10 or r<.10). While there is a risk that tests were underpowered,
given the potentially small latent effect, a sample of more than 600
additional cases would be required to conclude definitively that OECD
status was unrelated to amounts awarded.1 30 In the interim, the small effect
sizes and non-significant results are an additional piece of evidence that
OECD status was not reliably linked to outcomes.
(b) Awards as a Function of World Bank Status
A second set of models analyzed amounts awarded as a function of the
respondent's World Bank status. In contrast to the findings related to
OECD (and the next analysis of HDI), both models revealed a statistically
130. See supra note 120 (observing how,when analyzing the two-category OECD variable when
the effect size is small or less than small (r < .10) a sample of 781 final ITA cases would be required
to obtain sufficient levels of power, which requires 637 final cases to establish the requisite power).

46

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 55:1

meaningful link between respondent states' World Bank status and
amount awarded.
For the set of all awards, three tests identified a statistically meaningful
link between a respondent state's development status and the amount
awarded. Irrespective of whether inflation-adjusted raw (F(3,155)=4.223;
p=.01; r-.28; n=159), winsorized (F(3,155)=4.176; p=.01; r=.27; n=159),
or logged (F(3,155)=3.833;p=.01; r-.26; n=159) data were used, there was
a reliable link between development status and outcomes. Table 4 displays
the mean amounts awarded against states as a function of their World
Bank classification.
Table 4: Inflation-Adjusted Winsoriked Damages of Amounts Awarded in Set of
All FinalITA Cases as a Function of Respondent State's World Bank Classification
Respondent State
Mean U.S. Dollar Award
SD
Total
High Income
626,310
2,410,144
28
Upper-Middle Income
3,986,975
5,356,584
71
Lower-Middle Income
2,359,771
4,195,751
46
LowIncome
4,281,437
5,285,719
14
Total
2,950,324
4,766,128
159
The overallpatternwas statisticallysignificant at the .05 and.01 levels.
The main effect for World Bank status, however, was somewhat
misleading. Not every follow-up comparison between categories generated
13
the statistically significant result. Follow-up analyses using Tukey's HSD 1
on winsorized data revealed that only awards rendered against High Income
states were reliably lower than awards against Upper-Middle Income states.
All five other follow-up analyses 32 failed to identify a statistically
meaningful difference attributable to World Bank status. Analyses using
raw 133 and logged 134 data exhibited a similar pattern.
For the subset of awards where investors were successful, respondents'
World Bank status was also reliably linked to amount awarded. This held
131. Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) test provides a follow-up for testing of a
significant omnibus effect to determine whether there are statistically significant differences among
different subsets of groups. FREDERICK J. GRAVETrER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, ESSENTIALS OF
STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 376 (8th ed. 2013); Franck, Development and Outcomes,

supra note 6, at 457 n.123, 468 n.151.
132. The other follow-ups involved: (1) H-igh versus Lower-Middle; (2) High versus Low Income;
(3) Upper-Middle versus Lower-Middle; (4) Upper-Middle versus Low; and (5) Lower-Middle versus
Low.
133. Using inflation-adjusted raw data with statistical outliers, there was a significant effect
whereby Lower-Middle Income states experienced lower mean awards (US$6,218,317; SD=17796366;
n=46) than Upper-Middle states (US$30,479,694; SD=6449143; n=71). As the data included outliers,
the results must be treated cautiously.
134. Using inflation-adjusted logged data, there was a significant effect. igh Income states
experienced lower mean awards (.89; SD=2.24; n=28) than Low Income states (3.92; SD=3.56;
n=14).

2014]

CONFLATING POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT?

true across the three models using inflation-adjusted raw (F(3,54)=3.618;
p=.02; r=.41; n=58), winsorized (F(3,54)=4.113;p=.01; r=.43; n=58), and
logged (F(3,54)=4.457;p=.01; r=.45; n=58) data. Unlike any other analysis
in this Article, the effect size of this model reflects that the effect of
World Bank status on amounts awarded was a medium to large effect using
Cohen's conventions.1 35 Table 5 reflects the mean amounts awarded in the
subset of awards where investors obtained damages, whether by virtue of
a settlement agreement or tribunal award. 136
Table 5: Inflation-Adjusted Winsorifed Damages of Amounts Awardedfor Subset of
Final ITA Cases Generating Payment to Investor as a Function of Reipondent State's
World Bank Classification
Respondent State
Mean U.S. Dollar Award
SD
Total
High Income
5,975,876
8,534,954
4
Upper-Middle Income
65,460,334
66,930,450
30
Lower-Middle Income
17,877,662
26,977,657
16
LowIncome
21,151,169
37,607,021
8
Total
42,120,095
57,037,330
58
The overallpattern was statisticaly significant at the .05 level.
Similar to the earlier discussion, for the subset of cases where investors
won, the main effect of a respondent's World Bank status was misleading.
Not all follow-up analyses generated significant results. Follow-up analyses
using Tukey's HSD tests on winsorized data showed that only the awards
against Lower-Middle Income states were statistically lower than UpperMiddle Income states. All five other follow-up analyses did not detect a
statistically meaningful difference, 137 and analyses using raw and logged 138
data exhibited similar results.
Although the raw inflation-adjusted data include statistical outliers,
Figure 2 reflects the variance in amounts awarded as a function of a
respondent's World Bank classification through a stem-and-leaf plot. The
thick black line, which represents the median, indicates that all states
experienced median awards under US$50 million. More specifically, using
inflation-adjusted raw data, the median amounts awarded were

135. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
136. A Kruskal-Wallace test evaluated median differences between four groups. Using inflationadjusted raw data, that test revealed a meaningful group difference in median awards for all cases (x2
(3)=1l.452;p=.01; r-.26; n=15 9) and the subset of investor wins (X2 (3)=10.815;p=.0l; r-.39; n=58).
137. The other follow-ups were: (1) High versus Lower-Middle; (2) -igh versus Low Income; (3)
Upper-Middle versus Lower-Middle; (4) Upper-Middle versus Low; and (5) Lower-Middle versus
Low.
138. The follow-up tests using the inflation-adjusted raw data exhibited the same pattern. Using
inflation-adjusted logged data, however, there was also a significant effect whereby High Income
states (M=6.24; SD=.89; n=4) experienced lower mean amounts awarded than Upper-Middle Income
states (M=7.42; SD=.77; n=30).
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US$2,658,294 for High Income, US$6,606,299 for Lower-Middle Income,
and US$8,878,955 for Low Income states. In contrast, the median amount
awarded was US$38,567,138 for Upper-Middle Income states.
Nevertheless, Upper-Middle Income states experienced a wider
distribution of damage awards than the three other classifications and also
experienced a higher median award.
Figure 2: Stem-and-Leaf Plot of Damages Awarded Using Raw Inflation-Adjusted
Datafor Subset of FinalITA Cases Generating Payment to Investor as a Function
of Respondent State ' World Bank Classicafion
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(c) Awards as a Function of HDI Scores
A third set of models analyzed amounts awarded to investorswhether by virtue of a tribunal or via a settlement agreement - varied as
a function of a respondent state's HDI status. Like the results on OECD
status, all models failed to indicate that there was a reliable relationship
between HDI and amounts awarded. This held true for the set of all final
awards and the subset of cases involving disputes with an
investor recovery.
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For the set of all awards, three tests failed to identify a statistically
significant link between HDI status and amount awarded. Using a
Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient, it was not possible to
identify a reliable linear relationship between HDI and amounts awarded
using inflation-adjusted raw (K(157)=.08; p=.35), winsorized (r(157)=-.09;
p=.26), or logged (r(157)=-.12; p=.14) data. Figure 3 uses inflationadjusted winsorized data 139 to explore how amounts awarded vary
according to a respondent's HDI score. Figure 3 reflects three aspects.
First, a variety of states across the HDI scale were successful in avoiding
any amounts awarded. Second, a series of states across the HDI scale
experienced awards at the 75th percentile or higher. Third, for the group
experiencing awards between those levels, there were a range
of HDI scores.
Figure 3: Scatterplot of Damages Awarded Using Winsor Zed Inflation-Adjusted
Datain Set of All FinalITA Cases as a Function of Respondent State s HDI Score
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139. The process of winsorizing is an accepted practice in psychology to use Tukey's hinges to
minimize the effect of statistical outliers. Winsoizing ensures that outliers beyond the seventy-fifth
percentile of data distribution are capped at a common value to prevent data from being lost, while
also ensuring that skewed data does not inadvertently disrupt the assumptions underlying the test.
This accounts for the amounts awarded being capped at approximately US$120 million.
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For the subset of awards where investors obtained damages, HDI was
also not reliably linked to amounts awarded. This held true across the three
tests using inflation-adjusted raw (r(58)=.24; p=.08), winsorized (t(58)=.23;
p=.08), and logged (r(58)=.16; p=. 2 4) data. The raw and winsorized data
were on the cusp of significance but exhibited less acceptable levels of
skewing than the logged data. The nature of the potential relationship was
such that, the higher the amount awarded, the higher the respondent's
HDI score (i.e., the more developed the respondent state). The logged
data, which exhibited the most appropriate skewing levels, was not on the
cusp of significance.
The effect sizes for models of all amounts awarded were either
statistically small or trivial (r=.10 or r<.10) and not necessarily
underpowered; 140 but for the subset of cases involving investor wins, the
potential small- to medium-sized effects meant the analyses were
underpowered. 141 To reliably ascertain the presence of the smallest effect,
a sample of more than 600 additional cases would be required to conclude
that HDI was definitively unrelated to amounts awarded. In the interim,
the results provide evidence that HDI scores were not reliably linked to
amounts awarded.
3. Relative Success and Development
Models evaluating relative investor success offer a uniform scale for
analyzing outcomes irrespective of amount claimed and provide a proxy to
partially control for a case's underlying merit. 142 As such, models analyzing
140. See supra note 120 (observing how, when analyzing a correlation using HDI for a small or
less than small (r :5 .10) effect size, a sample of 781 final ITA cases would be required to obtain
sufficient levels of power, which requires an additional 637 final cases).
141. For the small- to medium-sized effects (r=.16-r=.24), there was roughly 20-40% power and
an unacceptable risk of error. To obtain sufficient power to identify the smallest of those effects
(r.16), 373 final cases where investors won would be required to establish sufficient power. In other
words, this would require 315 new cases where investors won or, put differently, a roughly 600%
increase in the historical number of cases in which investors obtained damage awards.
142. Given the lack of de jure precedent in ITA and the absence of an appellate body to create
legal coherence, it is difficult to identify legally correct outcomes. See Nick Gallus, Protection ofiNonGovernmental OrganiZaionsin Egypt Under the Egpt- U.S. BilateralInvestment Treay, 14 INT'L J. NOTat
67,
available
L.,
Sept.
2012,
at
62,
FOR-PROFIT
http://www.icnl.org/research/ournal/voll4iss3/vl4n3%20fma.pdf ("[Djecisions are certainly not
always consistent and a decision on the interpretation of a provision is far from a guarantee that a
similar provision, or even the same provision, will be interpreted the same way by another trbunal.";
Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lanyer: Arbitration Without Legitimafy, LIT. DAILY, June 7, 2013,
available at http://www.litigationdaily.com/id= 1202603368340/The-Global-Lavyer-ArbitrationWithout-Legitimacy (quoting Catherine Rogers as stating, "no study can control for the correct legal
outcome"); Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of InternationalInvestment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 223, 234-35 & n.42 (2013) (noting that others attempted to control for a case's legal
correctness "by having those challenges assessed by a panel of reputable investment arbitration
specialists" after the dispute was decided, which creates a risk of hindsight bias and suggests that
relative success provides a measure to control for legal merits).
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this variable are more valuable than models analyzing amounts awarded.
The last group of tests, therefore, evaluated development status as a
function of relative investor success - namely the percentage difference
between an investor's claim and the amount awarded. 43 Irrespective of
whether OECD, World Bank, or HDI measures were used, it was not
possible to identify a reliable link between respondent development status
and relative investor success.
First, a t-test analyzed respondent's OECD status and relative investor
success. The results failed to identify a reliable relationship between the
respondent's OECD status and relative investor success (t(101)=.707;
p=.48; r=.07; n=103). See Table 6. Even when focusing on the small subset
of cases where investors won, it was also not possible to establish a
reliable link between investors' relative success and respondents' OECD
status (t(51)=-.611;p=.54; r=.09; n=53).
Table 6: Mean Rates of Relative Investor Success in Set of All FinalITA Cases as a
Function of Respondent State ' OECD Status
Total
SD
Relative Percent of Investor Success
Respondent State
33
28.12
15.35
OECD
70
25.11
19.25
Non-OECD
103
26.04
18.00
Total
Thepattern was not statisticaly significant at the .05, .01, or .001 levels.
Table 6 reflects a facial trend where investors were generally more
successful in obtaining relatively larger awards against non-OECD states.
This facial difference, however, was not statistically meaningful, could have
been due to chance alone, and was less than statistically small.144 Moreover,
when focusing on the subset of investor wins, the facial pattern flipped,
and investors suing OECD states were relatively more successful (39%)
compared to their non-OECD counterparts (33.7%). Given the trivial
effect sizes (r<.10) for the non-significant effects, the tests may not have
been underpowered; yet, given the risk of error, replication will require
more than 600 additional cases to conclude reliably that there was no
145
The
effect of respondent OECD status on relative investor success.

143. Because not all awards contained a reliable statement of the amount of an investor's claim,

as compared to previous analyses, this decreased the cases analyzed.
144. Previous scholarship has described the importance of effect sizes in understanding the
importance of statistically reliable relationships and the importance of understanding the potential
size of potential latent effects. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 6, at 457-58, 461, 466,
475 (discussing the role and importance of effect sizes); Franck, ICSID Effect, supra note 14, at 85660 (discussing the effects of various effect sizes that were small or less than small).

145. See supra notes 120 & 130 (observing how, when analyzing the two-category OECD variable
when the effect size is small or less than small (r < .10) a sample of 781 final ITA cases would be
required to obtain sufficient levels of power, which requires 637 new cases for sufficient power).
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results provide additional evidence that ITA outcomes were not dependent
on respondents' OECD status.
A second model used a one-way ANOVA to analyze respondent World
Bank status and relative investor success. 146 The results failed to identify a
reliable relationship between respondent World Bank status and relative
success (F(3,99)=.419; p=.74; r=.11; n=103). See Table 7. Even when
focusing on the small subset of cases where investors won, it was not
possible to establish a reliable link between investors' relative success and a
respondent's World Bank status (F(3,49)=1.025;p=.39; r=.24; n=53).
Table 7 suggests that investors may experience more relative success
against Low Income states. This facial difference, however, was not
statistically meaningful. The facial difference must be viewed cautiously, as
the median rate of relative investor success was 1.9%.147
Table 7: Mean Rates of Relative Investor Success in Set of All FinalITA Cases as a
Function of Respondent State ' World Bank Development Status
Respondent State Relative Percent of Investor Success
SD Total
High-Income
14.53
32.53
15
Upper-Middle Income
17.40
22.69
47
Lower-Middle Income
17.95
26.78
31
LowIncome
26.19
30.34
10
Total
18.00
26.04 103
Thepattern was not statisticaly significantat the .05, .01, or.001 levels.
For the subset of investor wins, the facial pattern of relative investor
success flipped. In that subset, the mean investor success rate was 35.98%
(n=53). High Income states were exposed to the highest relative mean
recovery (54.5%; n=4), followed by Low Income states (37.4%; n=7), and
then Lower-Middle Income States (37.1%; n=15). Upper-Middle Income
states experienced the lowest levels of relative investor success (30.3%;
n=27). 148 In other words, investors arbitrating against High Income states
obtained awards for relatively more of their claims, whereas investors
suing Upper-Middle Income states experienced the lowest levels of relative
investor success. Yet inferences should be made cautiously, given the lack
of statistical significance and the risk that effects could be due to chance
alone. There was a risk that the tests were underpowered, particularly for
146. Because not all awards contained a reliable statement of the amount of an investor's claim,
as compared to previous analyses, this decreased the number of cases analyzed in the model.
147. For the set of all cases, the median success rates were: (1) 0.0% for High Income; (2) 17.4%
for Upper-Middle Income; (3) 0.0% for Lower-Middle Income; and (4) 14.7% for Low Income
states.

148. This median rate of investor success was similar for the subset of investor wins. The overall
median success rate was 28.7% for the subset of cases involving an investor win (n=53). For the
subset of awards where investors were successful, median success rates were: (1) High Income =
54.6%; (2) Upper-Middle = 27.3%; (3) Lower-Middle = 29.7%; (4) Low Income = 27.7%.
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the subset of cases where investors won. Nevertheless, replication with
nearly 1500 more cases should have sufficient statistical power to reliably
identify whether there is a link between World Bank status and relative
investor success. 149 Nevertheless, the results offer another piece of
evidence that development status was not reliably linked to outcome.
Figure 4: Scatterplot of Investor's Relative Success in Set of All FinalITA Cases as
a Function of Respondent State HDI Score
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A third model evaluated the relationship between an investor's relative
success and respondent HDI scores. Using a Pearson's Product-Moment
Correlation Coefficient, it was not possible to identify a meaningful linear
relationship between investor relative success and HDI (r(103)=-.07;
149. Where the effect size is small, as for relative investor success rates in all cases as a function
of respondent World Bank status (r-.11; S=781), the power of the analysis is less than 209/6, which
may reflect the absence of the effect or a latent small effect. A ptiori power analysis would require a
total of .1,562 final awards to provide sufficient power to detect a potential effect. This means it
would be necessary to ascertain 1,459 final awards with complete information on relative success. For
the subset of investor wins, there was a small- to medium-effect size (r-.25; S=120), which means a
post hoc power analysis has only 50% power. A piori power analysis indicates that, to have sufficient
power to reliably ascertain the impact of the four-category variable of respondents' World Bank
status, there would need to be 240 total ITA awards rendered in investors' favor (N=n(120/2) * k(4)).
As there were only 53 cases with complete information on investors' relative success where investors
won, this requires 187 total new cases, which is a roughly 300% increase in cases. See also supra note
121 (observing how, when there is a small- to medium-effect size (r-.20), 382 total final treaty awards
were required).
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p=. 4 7). Figure 4 reflects the distribution of relative investor success, which
compared amounts claimed and awarded with respondent HDI status.
Even for the subset of awards involving investor success, there was no
significant link between investors' relative success and HDI ((58)=-.03;
p=.8 3). Although the results indicated that any potential relationship was
close to zero, the facial trends both suggested that the lower respondents'
HDI score, the higher investors' relative success. Given the statistically
small effect size (r<.10), it is possible that the analyses were not
underpowered. But the risk of error related to the potential latent effect
means that more than 600 additional cases are needed to conclude
definitively that relative success and HDI operated independently. Until
then, the results are further evidence that a state's HDI status did not
0
affect ITA outcomes.15
B. Development Status and Democracy Levels
Two different models - using amounts awarded' 51 and relative investor
success 15 2 - indicated a respondent state's democracy levels were linked
to ITA outcomes at the p<.10 level.' 5 3 The facial trend, which was nonsignificant at the traditional p<.05 level, was that higher levels of
54
democracy were associated with positive ITA outcomes for states.
Given those results, it is useful to explore the relationship between
respondent democracy levels and development status. Irrespective of how
development was defined, tests always identified a reliable link between a
respondent state's development status and democracy level. This suggests

150. Seesupra notes 120 & 130 (observing how, when analyzing correlation between HDI and
outcomes when there is a small or less than small (r < .10) effect size, a sample of 781 final ITA
cases would be required to obtain sufficient power to reliably exclude the possibility of a latent effect,
which requires an additional 637 final cases).
151. A Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient between a respondent's Polity IV
score and winsorized inflation-adjusted amounts awarded came closest to statistical significance
(r(1 58)=-.15; p=.06). The direction of the potential relationship suggested that the lower a state's
level of democracy, the higher the overall amount awarded; and the higher a state's level of
democracy, the lower the amount awarded. Logged inflation-adjusted data reflected the same
direction of the data (r(158)=-.11;p=.19).
152. A Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient of Polity IV score and an investor's
relative success was not significant at traditional p<.05 levels (r(103)=-.18; p=.07). The direction of
the potential relationship was that as a state's democracy level increases, the smaller the investor's
relative success; and as a state's democracy level decreases, the higher the investor's relative success.
153. For the set of all awards, there was not a statistically significant relationship between
whether an investor or state won and the democracy score (r(158)=.08;p=.35). The direction of the
potential relatonship was such that states with higher levels of democracy were linked with wins,
whereas states with lower levels of democracy were associated with losses.
154. For the subset of investor wins, it was not possible to identify a significant link between
outcomes and Polity IV scores. There was no reliable linear relationship for amounts awarded using
winsorized (r(58)=-.14; p=.30) or logged ((58)=-.03; p=. 80) data; likewise there was no reliable
relationship between investors' relative success and democracy levels (K53)=-.16;p=.24).
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that development status and democracy levels were related, and it is critical
to control for potential co-linearity.
For all of the 202 individual cases in the dataset, 155 there was a strong,
reliable, and robust relationship between a respondent state's level of
development and its level of democracy. First, there was a link between a
respondent's OECD status and Polity IV (r(201)=.29; p<.001). The
direction was such that states that were OECD members were more likely
to have high democracy levels, whereas non-OECD members were less
likely to have high democracy levels. Second, there was a reliable link
between respondent World Bank status and Polity IV (t(201)=-.57;
p<.001). The direction was such that High Income states were more likely
to have high levels of democracy, whereas less developed states were likely
to have lower levels of democracy.1 56 Third, there was a link between a
respondent's HDI and Polity IV scores (K199)=.60;p<.00l). The direction
was such that, the higher a state's human development, the more likely it
was to experience high levels of democracy. In contrast, a lower human
development score was linked with lower levels of democratic institutions.
For the set of final awards, 157 there was also a robust link between
development status and respondent state democracy. First, there was a link
between OECD status and Polity IV (r(158)=.30; p<.001). Second, there
was a link between World Bank status and Polity TV (t(158)=-.46;p<.001).
Third, there was a link between HDI scores and Polity IV ((156)=.59;
p<.001). For all measures of development status, as respondent
development status increased, it was more likely to have increased levels of
democracy. Likewise, the lower the respondent's development status, the
less likely it was to experience high levels of democracy. There were similar
58
results for the subset of cases in which investors were successful.1

This relationship, which generally reflected a large statistical effect,
suggests that it is possible that the debate on ITA has perhaps confused
development concerns with concerns that relate to democratic governance
or a state's internal good governance practices. Should concerns about
155. It was not possible to identify a Polity IV and/or a HDI score for a small number of cases.
156. The negative statistical relationship is a by-product of how World Bank classifications were
coded, with "1" as High Income, "2" as Upper-Middle Income, "3" as Lower-Middle Income, and
"4" as Low Income.
157. For the 159 final cases, it was not possible to identify a Polity IV and/or a HDI score for
respondents in 1-3 cases.
158. For the subset of investor wins, there was a strong and reliable relationship between: (1)
Polity IV and World Bank Status ((58)=-.47;p<.001); and (2) Polity IV and HDI (r(58)=.65;p<.001).
The link between OECD status and Polity IV was non-significant (r(58)=.22;p=.l 0) at the traditional
p=.05 level. The facial trend for the OECD analysis mirrored the significant results for World Bank
and HDI classifications, namely, when respondent states' HDI levels increased, states were more
likely to have higher levels of democracy. Likewise, when respondent states' HDI levels decreased,
states were more likely to have lower levels of democracy.
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development be conflated with those related to domestic governmental
institutions and political infrastructure, concerns about the integrity of
ITA may be attributed to the wrong variable. It is possible that outcomes
may reflect a host state's underlying political situation, commitment to
democratic governance, or some other explanatory variable(s), rather than
a state's development status or poverty levels. To address the potential
conflation, the next Subpart reevaluates outcomes - but only after
controlling for respondents' internal levels of democracy.
C. Controllingfor Democray Levels - Re-Evaluating the I ink Between
Development Status and Outcomes
There is value in tracing the variance in ITA outcomes to meaningful
elements, rather than misattributing the impact of spurious or
confounding variables. The research therefore used a partial correlation to
control for the effect of a respondent state's democracy levels on ITA
outcomes. The tests explored whether there were any subsisting
relationships between development status and outcomes after removing
the variance attributable to Polity IV scores. A series of twelve partial
correlations were completed to identify whether, overall, there was a link
among: (1) OECD membership, (2) World Bank classification, and (3)
HDI scores and outcomes. The four outcome variables analyzed were: (1)
raw wins and losses; (2) inflation-adjusted amounts awarded using
winsorized data; (3) inflation-adjusted amounts awarded using logged data;
and (4) investor relative success.
Table 8 reports the results of those twelve tests. In every test the results
were not statistically significant, and the effect size of the potential
relationship was less than statistically small (i.e., r<.10). In other words,
after eliminating the influence of host state democracy levels, the potential
strength of the non-significant relationship was weak. Given the small
effect size of any potential effect, the statistical power of the analysis was
necessarily low, and technically, the risk of error for small effect sizes
means it is not possible to conclude a relationship is impossible. With such
a small effect size, however, a priori power analysis requires obtaining a
sample of more than 600 additional final cases to reliably ascertain
whether a latent effect is present or absent.15 9 This is roughly equivalent to
159. For the set of all awards in Table 8, the largest effect size for the partial correlations was
r-.12 and the smallest was r--.01. In order to identify the smallest potential effect, a priori power
analysis necessitates roughly 80% power, or a 20% risk of a Type II error. With such a small .10
effect size, it is therefore necessary to gather a large group of cases, or 781, to identify the possibility
of a reliable correlation among the variables. With 159 final awards at present, not all of which
contain complete information on relative success, at a minimum, it will be necessary to obtain 637
extra final cases to establish the requisite power. See also supra notes 120, 130, & 150 (identifying the
need for 781 final cases to conduct analysis and requiring 637 further final cases).

2014]

CONFLATING POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT?

taking the first two decades of final investment treaty cases, where there
were 159 final awards, and increasing that caseload by roughly 400%.

Table 8: All Cases: Partial Correlation Matrix Reflecting Relationships Among
Respondent State Development Status and Outcome, Controllingfor Reipondent State
Polity IV Score
Outcome and Type of
Correlation
Statistical
State Development Status
Co-Efficient (r) Significance (p) Total
Win/Loss and OECD
.09
.27
139
Win/Loss and
.07
.39
139
World Bank
Win/Loss and HDI
.02
.87
139
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Winsorized)
-.07
.36
153
and OECD
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Winsorized)
.05
.57
153
and World Bank
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Winsorized)
.01
.95
153
and HDI
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Logged)
-.09
.24
153
and OECD
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Logged)
.12
.15
153
and World Bank
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Logged)
-.07
.42
153
and HDI
Relative Investor
Success and OECD
Relative Investor Success
.01
.92
100
and World Bank
Relative Investor Success
.06
.53
100
and HDI
None of thepartialcorrelationswas signifcant at the .05, .01, or .001 levels.
A second set of analyses focused only on the smaller subset of those
cases where investors won. The objective was again to remove the variance
attributable to a state's democracy levels and then re-assess the potential
link between state development status and outcomes. A series of nine
different partial correlations explored the potential links among: (1)
OECD membership, (2) World Bank classification, and (3) HDI scores
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and outcomes. The outcome variables analyzed were: (1) inflation-adjusted
amounts awarded using winsorized data; (2) inflation-adjustment amounts
awarded using logged data; and (3)investor relative success.
Table 9 provides the results of the nine tests. Even for the subset of
cases reflecting some form of investor recovery, none of the tests could
identify a statistically meaningful link between development and outcomes
after controlling for the effect of a respondent state's democracy level.
Table 9." Subset of Cases Involving Investor Awards: Partial Correlation Matrix
Reflecting RelationshipsAmong Reipondent State Development Status and Outcome,
Controllingfor Polity IV Score
Outcome and Type of
Correlation
Statistical
Co-Efficient (r) Significance (p) Total
State Development Status
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Winsorized)
-.10
.78
55
and OECD
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Winsorized)
-.20
.14
55
and World Bank
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Winsorized)
.23
.09
55
and HDI
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Logged)
-.04
.78
55
and OECD
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Logged)
-.17
.19
55
and World Bank
Inflation-Adjusted
Awards (Logged)
.24
.08
55
and HDI
Relative Investor
Success and OECD
Relative Investor Success
.10
.48
50
and World Bank
Relative Investor Success
.13
.38
50
and HDI
None of the partialcorrelations was significant at the .05, .01, or.001 levels.
The potential relationships that came closest to generating a reliable link
involved amounts awarded using either a World Bank- or HDI-based
definition of development status. In each of those analyses, the direction
of the potential relationship was notable; namely, as states' development
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levels increased, the amounts awarded against states increased. 160 If the
concern about ITA is that it disparately affects the developing world (rather
than the developed world), the results potentially undercut the narrative. A
reasonable alternative explanation for the results, however, is that the
higher amounts awarded against developed states reflected the higher value
of investments made in developed states as compared to developing states,
which could cause similar conduct to create larger fiscal risk. The tests
analyzing investors' relative success implicitly address the disparity
generated by the different values of individual investments as the claimed
value is reflected by the outcome variable. As such, those tests are
particularly valuable, as they partially address case selection effects
generated by the underlying relative value of the investment or otherwise
provide a proxy for a case's merits. 161 All tests of relative investor success
indicated that any potential effect was statistically small, and the results
were not significant.
Given the analyses with statistically small effect sizes, the power of
several tests was inevitably low. 162 Caution should therefore be used in
making strong inferences about the lack of any effect, or the lack of bias
within the system, as it is not possible to conclusively prove the lack of an
effect. Nevertheless, the robust replication of previous research using
more sophisticated methods to control for the potential impact of
extraneous variables, and the existence of more than twenty analyses
failing to identify a link, is additional evidence of the potential lack of a
reliable relationship between development status and ITA outcomes. While
the tests cannot prove the absence of a result, the results provide insight
for future research and may promote understanding in the ongoing debate
about ITA.

160. For World Bank status, the potential relationship is reflected by a negative correlation, as
lower scores of development status reflected higher levels of state development. See supra note 156
and accompanying text. In contrast, for HDI scores, higher scores indicated higher levels of
development.
161. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (identifying the value of focusing on relative
investor success).
162. For the subset of cases where investors obtained awards in Table 9, five of the nine analyses
had effect sizes that were small or less than small. This suggests that the results may not suffer from a
power problem as the potential link between development status and outcomes, once democracy
levels were controlled, was negligible. It also reflects that 781 total cases are necessary for sufficient
statistical power to reliably identify the lack of an effect. See also supra note 159. Four of the nine
analyses had small- to medium-sized effects. While the power of those analyses was stronger (3040% power), it was still insufficient. To detect the largest potential effect, 120 cases involving
investors who obtained damage awards would be required. As it is necessary to have a sufficiently
large sample to identify the smallest potential effect, the larger sample would be required to have
sufficient power to make reliable conclusions about the lack of effects.
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V.DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In light of the quantitative empirical findings of Part IV, this Part first
offers a synthesis of those results. It then argues that development status
and democracy require disentanglement so that the policy debate does not
unduly conflate the effects of politics and development. Only after
separating the variance attributable to each variable and potential
interactions will stakeholders be in a position to tailor their normative
reforms to achieve their ultimate objectives. It then acknowledges the
limitations of the analyses and recommends replication of this research.
A. Synthesis and Observalions
Overall, the vast majority of the tests failed to identify any reliable link
between ITA outcomes and the development status of respondent states.
The only set of tests that identified a reliable link between development
and outcomes used a World Bank definition and amounts awarded; but
states' World Bank classifications nevertheless failed to generate a
significant link to investors' relative success. When controlling for
democracy levels, none of the twenty-one models analyzed could identify a
reliable link between outcome and respondent development status. The
results of those tests suggest that a host state's level of democracy, some
aspect of domestic political infrastructure, or other variables or
163
combinations of variables could exert more influence on ITA outcomes.
In keeping with the themes of the Symposium panel's focus on politics,
one might hypothesize that ITA outcomes may be a function of a state's
internal compliance with good governance practices, difficulties with
corruption, or lack of a stable and transparent regulatory environment. To
the extent that such variables relate to the cause of action and a claim's
merits, a state may choose to settle or to successfully defend cases.
When analyzing ITA outcomes as a binary function of whether states
won or lost, there was no reliable relationship between outcomes and
development status. Analyzing development status three different ways
(OECD, World Bank, and HDI) all generated uniform and robust results.
Descriptively, the general trend was for states to win cases either at roughly
equivalent levels to investors or at a slightly higher rate than investors. The
only facial, but non-significant, pattern in the overall data was that
developed states sometimes (but not always) won more than developing
states. For example, High Income states won slightly more than UpperMiddle Income states, and Lower-Middle Income states won slightly more
than their Upper-Middle income counterparts. The either roughly
163. Theoretically, there could be a series of variables affecting outcome, which was beyond the
Symposium panel's focus on politics. There may, however, be a variety of other variables affecting
ITA outcomes. See sapranote 74.
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equivalent or state-favorable outcomes provide intriguing evidence that
runs counter to claims of "pro-investor" bias in ITA. Rather, it suggests
that while both states and investors won at roughly equivalent levels,
perhaps some statesparticularly High Income and Lower-Middle
Income states - obtained particularly "pro-state" outcomes. While some
state stakeholders may feel disadvantaged, the data suggest a more realistic
interpretation that all categories of states generally won at least half of
their cases, but two categories of states had somewhat better rates of
winning cases. While some stakeholders may perceive the comparative
advantage of multiple sub-groups of other states as "bias," it may only
reflect the general balance in ITA outcomes where states tended to win
about half the cases at a minimum. Yet it also should generate systemic
inquiry into why some categories of states obtained proportionately larger
state-favorable outcomes.
Focusing on states' relative success reveals a similar narrative. When
assessing ITA outcomes as a function of the percentage of a state's fiscal
liability (as compared to the investors' amounts claimed), it was not
possible to identify a reliable link between outcomes and development
status. The null results were robust across all models, irrespective of
whether development status was measured using OECD, World Bank, or
HDI definitions of "development status." While not conclusive, it is
further evidence that a state's relative success in ITA may operate
independently of development status, that investors' relative success may
be roughly equivalent across various different development classifications,
or there may be other variables that make an important contribution to
ITA outcomes. Beyond the inferential statistics, it is critical to observe that
investors' relative success rates were generally low, with a mean recovery
of less than 20% (a 2 % median) in the set of all cases. This investor
success rate seems at odds with claims of a pro-investor bias. For the
subset of cases where investors won, there was a 36% mean
(approximately 30% median) of relative investor success. While nonsignificant and statistically unreliable, one facial pattern suggested that
investors recovered relatively larger amounts against High Income states.
This result may derive from parties making more conservative claims
against developed states, but it may also reflect that investors were
unwilling to initiate ITA against a developed state or had other alternatives
to facilitate dispute settlement. A case selection effect could also create
incentives for investors to only pursue the most meritorious claims against
developed states. Although drawing definitive conclusions is premature,
the results suggest there is a phenomenon worthy of further inquiry. The
results raise questions about how investors decide to bring claims against
states and when to place their political and economic capital at risk in ITA.
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The only area of divergence involved pure amounts awarded, which is a
measure that neither accounts for amounts in dispute nor the potential
merits of the claim. Like earlier analyses of binary outcomes or relative
success, it was not possible to identify a reliable relationship between
amounts awarded and two measures of development status, namely
OECD membership and HDI scores. Using either of those metrics, the
relative distribution of amounts awarded was reliably different. Those nonsignificant results were replicated even when analyzing the subset of cases
where states were found liable.
Analyzing amounts awarded as a function of World Bank classification,
however, generated a divergence in the data and did not replicate earlier
research. 164 This suggests that, over time, the ITA system has evolved, the
sample size has gained sufficient power, or previously latent effects were
sufficiently large to become detectable. Irrespective of whether the group
of all awards or only the subset of investor wins was analyzed, there was a
statistically meaningful difference among states depending upon their
World Bank classification. Namely, High Income states experienced
statistically lower awards than their Upper-Middle income counterparts;
other comparisons between groups had roughly equivalent amounts
awarded. 65 These findings perhaps explain why there has been an emotive
push to reject ITA. Heuristics may intuitively use raw amounts awarded
and classification of easily discernable World Bank classifications as a "rule
of thumb" to assess ITA. Focusing on World Bank development status
analyses in isolation could create an instinctually credible perception of
bias against the developing world. It reflects a reasonable "System 1"
emotive response 166 and may contribute to the current dynamic debate
about ITA's future.
Nevertheless, an over-emphasis on initial impressions can be misleading
and can lead to sub-optimal decisionmaking about normative reforms.
Rather, the results must be viewed in context and re-framed to override (or
aid re-assessment of) intuitive judgments. 67 The vast majority of
analyses - and all of the relative success analyses that partially control for
164. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 6.
165. There were, however, two potential latent effects. In one model, follow-up analyses
identified that Upper-Middle Income states experienced statistically higher amounts awarded
compared to Lower-Middle Income states; another model reflected that amounts awarded against
Low Income states were higher than High Income states. See supra notes 133-34.
166. See Anne Van Aaken, Behavioral InternationalLaw and Economics, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421
(2014); Tomer Broude, BehavioralInternationalLaw, 163 PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2320375##;

see

also FRANCK,

MYTHS

&

REALITIES, supra note 14 (discussing the biases and heuristics literature and the potential impact upon
the ITA debate); KA-NEMAN, sapranote 41 (describing System 1 responses in depth).
167. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et a.
eds., 1982); KAHNEMAN, supra note 41; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the ReaAkv of Cognitive
Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582 (1996).
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legal merits - failed to reliably identify a significant result and generally
found that any latent relationship was statistically small. Moreover, it is
critical to recall the basic descriptive data that, overall, the average amount
awarded using raw inflation-adjusted data was under US$20 million. 168
When excluding those cases where states were not found liable, the mean
amount awarded was approximately US$45 million. 169 These figures are in
contrast with assertions that "[w]hat it takes to distinguish yourself these
days is a US$350 million award, minimum." 170 Moreover, when considering
the distribution of data even across the World Bank categories, the
distribution of liability for High Income, Lower-Middle, and Low Income
states was roughly parallel in terms of median awards and general
distributions. 171 Upper-Middle Income states, however, generated more
variance and had a larger number of cases, 172 a higher median award, and a
greater distribution of amounts awarded.
The results, however, raise important questions about how to explain
the solitary set of significant results given the overall data. Procedural and
substantive aspects likely contributed to the results.
Methodologically, the results could reflect the use of amounts awarded
as the dependent variable; as previously identified, amounts awarded do
not address amounts claimed, do not generate a standardized measure for
analyzing cases, and do not provide a partial proxy to address legal merits.
Additionally, the results might reflect the use of a categorical independent
variable, like World Bank status, to define development status. A fourcategory variable compresses variance into a small set that facilitates the
identification of meaningful differences, rather than lumping it bluntly into
a binary variable (as with the OECD) that can mask variation.
Nevertheless, the use of a more sensitive variable, namely the continuous
HDI variable that also reflects broader goals of human development,
never generated a meaningful link to outcomes. It is therefore possible that
using the World Bank's preexisting categorical variable with four groups
compressing a great deal of variance into a single category (namely UpperMiddle Income) facilitated the identification of the significant results. As a

168. Franck, Confhit Management, supra note 8, at 14 (explaining raw inflation-adjusted data
generated average amounts awarded in all final cases of US$16.6 million); see also supra Tables 3 & 4
(indicating the winsorized inflation-adjusted data generated an average award of US$2.95 million).
169. Franck, Conflict Management, supra note 8, at 14 (explaining raw inflation-adjusted data
generated average amounts awarded in this subset of final cases of US$45.6 million); see also supra
Table 5 (indicating the winsorized inflation-adjusted data generated mean state liability of US$42.1
million).
170. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 5, at 14 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
171. See supra Figure 2.
172. This included the cluster of cases that involved a single government measure, namely
Argentina's response to its 2001 currency crisis.
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continuous variable, HDI is more nuanced and is likely a better proxy for
assessing development status.
Substantively, the effects may also be attributable to Argentina, as more
than 1/3 of the adverse awards involving Upper-Middle Income states
involved Argentina, and eight of the sixteen largest awards in the dataset
were against Argentina. 73 While Argentina undoubtedly generated
important variance, it is not clear whether Argentina's experiences with
ITA were representative or unrepresentative of ITA. Therefore, rather
than attempting to answer a potentially unanswerable question, a better
approach is to control for either the effect of Argentina or a related
construct. As Argentina has a complex political history, it is useful to
control for the real variable of interest - namely a state's internal political
infrastructure. Democracy levels can be a proxy for domestic political
institutions, and Polity IV scores are an established mechanism for
identifying variance related to democracy levels. It was telling that, no
matter which set of variables was analyzed, once democracy levels were
held constant, it was impossible to identify a link between respondent
development status and outcomes. Any potentially latent effects generally
74
reflected a statistically small phenomenon.
Recognizing the limitations identified earlier and in Part VC. below, as
well as the challenge of proving a negative, the vast majority of the
analysis failed to find that a respondent's development status was
meaningfully related to ITA outcomes. Where research cannot even
establish reliable relationship, it is logically improper to suggest the
existence of a causal relationship. In short, based upon the current
evidence, it is incorrect to claim that respondent states' development status
alone caused ITA outcomes. Future research may therefore wish to focus
on other factors, such as the identity of investors, the level of experience
of parties' lawyers, the impact of host country corruption, the level of
good governance practices, or the scope of regulations related to
Corporate Social Responsibility for investors.
B. Normative Implications
The results offer insights to inform the current ITA debate and to guide
stakeholders considering the potential use of arbitration in either the TPP
or TTIP negotiations. The results did not support claims that rejecting
ITA is necessary given potential problems of bias against states in general

173. FRANCK, MYTHS & REALITIES, supra note 14; seealso Franck, Review, supra note 118, at 895

(making a similar observation about the number of adverse cases against Argentina in an earlier
iteration of the dataset); supra note 172 (identifying the cluster of Argentina currency cases).
174. In the subset of investor wins, the trend was for developed states, rather than developing
states, to experience larger fiscal amounts awarded.
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or against developing states in particular. Rather, the results suggest that
ITA outcomes were not monolithic; a more nuanced approach to
understanding outcomes is necessary to craft reform measures tailored
both to generate enhanced international dispute settlement and to foster a
domestic investment climate furthering sustainable development.
The data first demonstrated that claims of pro-investor bias and claims
of disparate treatment of developing states - while well intentioned may have been overly simplistic. Rejecting ITA solely on the basis of the
impact upon states or potentially disparate treatment of the developing
world was not supported by the data. Rather, the data offered evidence
that disrupted claims of pro-investor bias in ITA. It seems odd to argue
that a system of adjudication was biased against states when: (1) states won
in equal or greater proportions than investors; (2) measures of central
tendency indicated that investors won less than US$20 million on average
overall; 175 and (3) in those cases where investors were successful, investors'
relative success was roughly 30% of the amount claimed.
The data also replicated earlier analyses indicating that it was not
possible to link a respondent state's development status to ITA outcomes.
While the analysis still lacked sufficient power to definitively prove the lack
of bias in ITA against the developing world, the overall results provided
additional evidence suggesting ITA may operate independently from a
respondent's development background or be attributable to variable(s)
other than development status. Nevertheless, one metric suggested ITA
outcomes varied according to development status - in a way that inured
to the benefit of only High Income states, as compared with only UpperMiddle Income states; this finding occurred in the context of pure
amounts awarded, which does not necessarily correspond with the amount
claimed. The presence of one set of tests, however, suggested that, over
time, the ITA caseload has evolved, and caution must be used when
recommending reforms for a system in flux. Making sweeping changes while a relatively new system of
like outright rejection of ITA international adjudication is still evolving seems somewhat extreme. A
more subtle approach is to view the significant results in context, to
understand the actual variance in ITA outcomes, and then to make tailored
reforms to address related concerns.
Rejecting ITA outright would not fix the inevitable problems that derive
from any system attempting to manage investment treaty conflict.
Investment-related conflict will always exist. The question is how best to
address that conflict. The core issues for consideration are: (1) how
investment treaty conflict can be channeled to generate value; and (2)
175. Even for the subset of awards where investors won, measures of central tendency indicated
typical state liability ranged from US$40-46 million. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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should adjudication be necessary, which adjudicator(s) in the national or
international regime are best situated to resolve disputes.
Regarding the first element, depriving investors of an adjudicative
forum would undercut the utility of other dispute resolution systems such as negotiation and mediation - as they exist in "the shadow of the
law"' 176 Without access to some adjudicative baseline, other forms of
dispute resolution would likely wither as viable methods of conflict
management. Rather than eliminating conflict, problems could either
periodically erupt in a dramatic international relations crisis or generate
downstream economic costs, possibly in the loss of foreign investment,
foregone development opportunities, or higher costs to receive the
investment. 177 As those possibilities are economically undesirable and may
cause social and political disruption, the better course is to offer direct
access to adjudication in appropriate cases, while simultaneously
promoting dispute prevention. 178 The objective should be to design
procedures in treaties to channel conflict into proper forums to minimize
cost and maximize value.
In the second element, nothing prevents states from promoting their
investment objectives through both national and international law
paradigms. This is, in fact, a typical approach in international criminal law
that recognizes that, although systemically complex, there is value in both
179
domestic and international law incentives.
Focusing on the complementarity 80 of national and international legal
regimes offers an opportunity to strengthen investment law. Domestic
176. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
177. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM

URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING

AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (lst ed. 1981) (exploring ways to analyze conflict management

and dispute settlement); see also Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 8; Mariana Hernandez
Crespo, Building the Latin America We Want: Supplementing Representative Democracies with ConsensusBuilding, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425 (2008); Mariana Hernandez Crespo G., From Noise to
Music: The Potential of the Multi-Door Courthouse (Casas de Jusficia) Model to Advance Systemic Inclusion and
Partidpationas a Foundationfor Sustainable Rule of Law in Latin America, 2012 J. DiSP. RESOL. 335; Welsh
& Schneider, supra note 8, at 3-4, 22-23.

178. Coe, Jr., supra note 113, at 8-9; Roberto Echandi, Conplementing Investor-State Dispute
Resolution: A

Conceptual Framework for Investor-State Conflict Management, in PROSPECTS

IN

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY: WORLD TRADE FORUM 270 (Roberto Echandi &

Pierre Suav6 eds., 2013) [hereinafter PROSPECTS]; Lucy Reed, Synopsis of Closing Remarks, in InvestorState Disputes, supra note 90, at 30; Margrete Stevens, ICSID at The Crossroads: Some Thoughts and
Recommendationsfor Improving the Dispute Settlement System, in PROSPECTS, supra, at 243, 258.
179. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007);
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralismof InternationalCriminalLaw, 86 IND. L.J. 1063 (2011); Gona
Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and InternationalLaw,121 YALE L.J. 252

(2011).
180. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM
THEORY TO PRACTICE (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011) (discussing
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remedies for investment disputes, offered by domestic court judges, have

value -

such as developing the legal capacity of local bench and bar. But

this does not undermine the value of international adjudication. Where
national court judges may be perceived to be (or actually are) biased in a
state's or a local actor's favor, it is sensible to place decisionmaking in an
adjudicator with enforceable duties of impartiality and potential civil
liability for misconduct. 81 Likewise, where streamlined international
enforcement is required, it is sensible to benefit from the established,
18 2
efficient, and preexisting legal infrastructure of international arbitration.
Meanwhile, there is no empirical proof that international arbitrators make
worse decisions than national court judges. Rather, there is evidence that
national court judges, even those from developed legal systems, like the
United States, fall prey to biases and heuristics deviating from the rational
183
actor model.
By rejecting ITA without a considered assessment of its net value in the
larger international conflict management system, the desire to generate
constructive reform could lead to externalities causing net harm to
international economic relationships. Moreover, generating normative
reform that fixes the wrong (or a non-existent) problem can lead to
systemic harm that destroys the gains international investment seeks
to produce.

complementarity in the context of international criminal law); SARAH M.H. NOUWEN,
COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN (2014) (same).

181. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Liabiliy of InternationalArbitrators:A Comparative Ana#sis and
Proposalfor Qualiied Immunity, 20 N.YL. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000) (identifying areas of
arbitrator liability and immunity).
182. Reliance on an international law regime for enforcement of arbitral awards is efficient and
effective. The New York Convention and ICSID Convention provide streamlined enforcement
procedures that are generally unavailable for the enforcement of domestic court judgments. See supra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text; Franck, Legitimay Crisis, supra note 5, at 1547-48, 1554-55. The
Hague Convention on the Choice of Courts Agreement has a narrow scope of covered agreements,
provides for a narrow scope for internationally enforceable domestic court judgments, and contains
multiple exceptions. See Jeffry Talpis & Nick Krnjevic, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements of June 30, 2005: The Elephant that Gave Birth to a Mouse, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 1
(2006). As there have only been three state parties that have signed or otherwise acceded since its
inception, it is not in effect. Status Table, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Courts Agreements,
HAGUE

CONFERENCE

ON

PRIVATE

INT'L

LAW,

http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last updated Nov. 19, 2010).
183. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudidalMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie et
al., The 'Hidden Judidary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477
(2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the BankruptgyJudge'sMind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227 (2006); see also
Mark Schweizer, Kognitive Tiuschungen vor Gericht (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Zurich), available at http://www.decisions.ch/dissertation.htn#Thesen (finding similar
evidence of cognition errors testing Swiss judges).
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This is not to say that the current system of international investment
dispute settlement is without flaws. Any system established by humans will
generate error. The more critical issue is how to craft reform measures to
minimize error, to address real problems, and to "fit the forum to the
fuss."' 184 This Article argues that generating useful normative solutions

requires a careful appreciation of ITA outcomes. An over-emphasis on
development status - to the exclusion of variables like state democracy
levels - risks conflating the variables potentially impacting adjudication.
Given that all measures of outcomes failed to reveal a link to any measure
of development once the variance attributable to a host state's democracy
was extracted, it seems inapposite to condemn ITA on the basis of
disparate treatment. Instead, it may be prudent to re-focus the debate onto
how domestic political institutions, transparency, and good governance
practices contribute to the creation of ITA disputes and ultimate
outcomes. 185 Alternatively, it may be appropriate to focus on other
variables that have reliable and demonstrative explanatory power. Likewise,
normative reforms for investment law might usefully focus on domestic
regulation and other internal political reforms. In this way, states can
exercise sovereignty to promote good governance practices and corporate
social responsibility on the domestic level. Even if the quality of a state's
internal political infrastructure does not influence ITA outcomes, focusing
on domestic good governance offers critical benefits that are in a state's
86
long-term interests, irrespective of its international law obligations.
The objective in international investment law should be to create
dispute resolution mechanisms that address actual, rather than perceived
or intuited, problems. This, in turn, requires identifying the real variables
driving ITA outcomes and restructuring conflict management processes to
address derivative concerns. International investment law stakeholders
should therefore consider focusing on other variables - perhaps the role
of lawyers, the background of investors, the role of third-party funders, or
184. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitingthe Forum to the Fuss:A User-Friendly Guide
to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994); Deborah M. Kolb & Susan S. Silbey,
Disputes, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE
Enhancingthe Capaioof Organizationsto Deal witb
315 0.William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
185. Such a focus suggests a host state's internal democracy or regulatory systems may ultimately
be better predictors of ITA outcomes. One might imagine, for example, that more egregious
government activity that violates principles of good governance - irrespective of whether this is
generated from conduct of a developed or developing state - is more likely to generate a finding of
state liability.
of
186. Beyond increasing compliance with international investment law and decreasing the risk
investors initiating ITA, focusing on good governance should increase the likelihood that states will
comply with their domestic law. Moreover, predictable and transparent regulatory regimes could
decrease commercial risk and thereby make a state more attractive to initial investment by foreign and
domestic investors, create incentives for existing investors to expand their investment, and promote
related development objectives.
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the merits of individual cases - as potential factors to generate reforms
to the current dispute resolution process. In the interim, as opposed to
putting effort into objecting to ITA, states may wish to shift their focus to
promoting and implementing good governance practices within their
jurisdictions and preventing investment conflict from erupting in the first
instance. An optimal result would involve states exercising their
sovereignty to promote activity that complies with domestic and
international law obligations, promotes a favorable investment climate, and
limits exposure to unnecessary or unmeritorious claims.
Ultimately, an over-emphasis on development status alone means that
implementing normative choices focused solely on a respondent state's
development status misses the opportunity to construct normative
solutions tailored to address real problems. The data demonstrated that,
when holding a respondent state's democracy levels constant, it was not
possible to reliably link ITA outcomes and development status. By
focusing on those variables that meaningfully affect ITA outcomes,
stakeholders can design more legitimate, targeted, and appropriate dispute
resolution processes in a time of international economic transition.
C. Limitations
It is important to understand the results within their proper context, as
it restrains the strength of the related inferences and scope of derivative
normative suggestions. Part III.A identified a series of limitations related
to case-selection bias, and Parts IV.A & B identified limitations related to
statistical power deriving from null-results. It is important to reinforce
these points and identify other relevant limitations.
First, there may be limitations to the strength of the inferences, as they
may not reflect population parameters. Inferences should be made
cautiously, particularly when considering whether the subsets analyzed are
representative of ITA as a whole. Replication with additional data is
necessary to avoid establishing a parameter that could reflect chance alone.
Second, there may be issues about the validity of the statistical
conclusions. Effect sizes suggest that the power of the research is low,
given the small size of the potentially latent effects. Yet, the statistically
small effect sizes may reflect that the analyses were not underpowered, and
that, even if future analyses were sufficiently powered, the relationship
may be of low practical significance. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to
establish a broader pool of data, based on an aprioripower of analysis that
would require more than 600 additional final ITA cases, to confirm, clarify,
contradict, or supplement these findings.
Third, the statistical models used were blunt, and the variables were
limited. This means that there would be utility in replicating and expanding
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this research by using more complicated models and additional variables to
refine both the research questions and the statistical conclusions. More
complex designs analyzing additional variables and/or combinations of
variables, multivariate regressions, or matching variables might help reflect
the complexities of reality and simultaneously decrease the likelihood of
statistical error.
Fourth, there may be issues related to external validity, since the results
come from data based on publicly available awards. It is possible that
publicly available awards do not represent the broader population of both
public and private awards. The data used for the analysis were coded from
awards that were publicly available as of January 1, 2012. Since there is
now roughly two additional years' worth of data to gather and analyze,
future research should replicate the analysis. Also, there are issues related
to case-selection bias. While there have been anecdotal comments
suggesting that the data is representative, this has not been empirically
confirmed. It is possible that these analyses may be limited and/or
systematically biased, particularly if there is a recent trend for investors to
avoid ICSID, which may mean that fewer cases find their way into the
public domain. Further research should consider the effect of this possible
case-selection bias.
As a result of these cautionary considerations, more research is required
to create sufficient power, stability, statistical control, and enhanced validity
necessary to reach more definitive conclusions. It will likely take years if not decades - before a sufficient pool of awards is available to run the
requisite analysis. While it makes future research challenging, it does not
diminish that this research replicated and expanded upon existing analyses.
Nevertheless, it is fundamental to recognize the limitations of statistical
power and related risks of error.
CONCLUSION

This Article has identified that democracy and development status can
be conflated; once the variance from democracy is controlled for, there
was not any evidence of a reliable relationship between ITA outcomes and
a state's development status. Without a careful analysis of ITA outcomes,
it is not possible to generate proper normative reforms. The analysis in
this Article cannot be used as a basis for eradicating ITA in its entirety.
While one model indicated critics of ITA have an intuitively grounded
basis for concern, upon further reflection and control, those potentially
concerning results dissipate. Viewing development variables in isolation
can create an improper impression of systemic bias when concerns might
be more appropriately focused on other variables - such as a state's
internal political infrastructure or other variables.
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While the dissatisfaction is understandable, care must be taken to avoid
creating dispute resolution systems that generate sub-optimal outcomes or
redress the wrong harm. As explaining ITA outcomes likely requires a
complicated, multivariate set of other variables, international investment
law should focus on designing dispute resolution systems tailored to
generate meaningful solutions to remedy demonstrable problems. By
shifting focus to variables that reliably contribute to the variance of ITA
outcomes, ITA will generate a more legitimate and appropriate dispute
resolution process in a time of international economic transition.

